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MISCONDUCT RISK
Christina Parajon Skinner*
Financial misconduct and systemic risk are two critical issues in
financial regulation today. However, for the past several years, financial
misconduct and systemic risk have received markedly different treatment.
After the global financial crisis, regulators responded to the traditional
quantitative risks that banks pose—those found on their balance sheets and
in their business models—with sweeping reforms on an internationally
coordinated scale. Meanwhile, with respect to misconduct, regulators have
reacted with a traditional enforcement approach—imposing fines and, in
some cases, prosecuting individual malefactors. Yet misconduct is not only
an isolated or idiosyncratic risk that can be spot treated with enforcement:
misconduct can also be a significant source of risk to the financial system,
particularly when it arises on an industry-wide basis.
This Article creates a framework for understanding how and under what
circumstances misconduct imposes such broad social and economic costs:
“misconduct risk.” This Article explores three features of the banking
industry that, in combination, can give rise to misconduct risk—deficient
accountability systems, performance-based compensation, and a fluid and
transient labor market. Drawing on this conceptual foundation, this Article
argues that misconduct risk requires a holistic and preventive approach on
par with regulators’ efforts to reduce classic balance sheet risks.
Specifically, this Article urges bank supervisors to design regulatory tools
that proactively target these contagion mechanisms in order to combat
misconduct risk. This Article proposes a novel supervisory tool—
“compliance stress testing”—and suggests how this tool can be
incorporated into the existing international framework for regulating
global banks.
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INTRODUCTION
The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 (“the Crisis”) motivated a sweeping
overhaul of financial regulation on an internationally coordinated scale. In
this post-Crisis order, regulators have singled out large global banks as
posing systemic risk—that is, the risk that distress in one global bank will
spread broadly among other financial institutions, with further spillover
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effects quite likely.1 This concern with systemic risk has led to tighter
restrictions on (and supervision over) banks’ financial activity.2
Financial misconduct has received markedly different treatment.
Although the world’s major economies now agree that bank misconduct is a
serious problem, they have yet to diagnose it as a market-wide risk that
requires forward-looking, preventative, and well-coordinated solutions.3
Indeed, each jurisdiction still responds to misconduct with primarily an ex
post enforcement approach.4 But misconduct is not only an isolated or
idiosyncratic risk that can be spot treated with enforcement. When bankers
and traders in large financial institutions manipulate or distort key
information,5 that misconduct can pose broad macro risks. In some
instances, such misconduct contributes to asset bubbles by fueling irrational
demand; in others, it weakens large institutions by frustrating market
1. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and
the Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 797 (2011);
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 207 (2008).
2. Hearing on Compensation Structure & Systemic Risk Before the H. Comm. on Fin.
Servs., 111th Cong. 7 (2009) (written testimony of Prof. Lucian Bebchuk),
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/Policy/FSC-written-testimony-June-11-09.pdf
[perma.cc/47ZG-ZC5Q].
3. See Mark J. Flannery, Chief Economist & Dir., Div. of Econ. & Risk Analysis,
Insights into the SEC’s Risk Assessment Programs (Feb. 25, 2015),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/insights-into-sec-risk-assessment-programs.html
(contrasting the SEC’s mission to detect misconduct with its assessment of “market-wide” or
“systemic” risks) [perma.cc/9YKR-5VNJ]; see also HM TREASURY, BANK OF ENG., FIN.
CONDUCT AUTH., FAIR AND EFFECTIVE MARKETS REVIEW: FINAL REPORT (2015) [hereinafter
AND
EFFECTIVE
MARKETS
REVIEW],
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/
FAIR
markets/Documents/femrjun15.pdf (addressing misconduct as a problem, but not specifically
through a systemic risk lens) [perma.cc/6BJG-AYHK]. But see EUR. SYSTEMIC RISK BD.,
REPORT ON MISCONDUCT RISK IN THE BANKING SECTOR 3 (2015) [hereinafter ESRB REPORT
ON MISCONDUCT], https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/150625_report_misconduct_
risk.en.pdf (suggesting that misconduct may present systemic risks) [perma.cc/6PK8KCQW].
4. See GRP. OF THIRTY, BANKING CONDUCT AND CULTURE: A CALL FOR SUSTAINED AND
COMPREHENSIVE REFORM 43 (2015) [hereinafter G30 CONDUCT AND CULTURE REPORT]
(noting that across jurisdictions “[t]here has been significant emphasis on prescriptive
conduct rules” and “[t]his has led to an enforcement-led approach to supervised firms”); id.
at 55 (noting the “current default approach . . . of almost sole reliance on deterrence and
enforcement”); see also Miriam H. Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92 B.U. L. REV. 577, 585–
611 (2012) (arguing that as a policy matter it is easier to punish than to regulate); David
Zaring, Litigating the Financial Crisis, 100 VA. L. REV. 1405, 1450 (2014) (reviewing
enforcement actions in the United States reacting to the Crisis).
5. Before proceeding further, some definitional clarification is needed. In its broadest
sense, financial misconduct is difficult to define. As scholars have elsewhere noted,
opportunistic or even deceptive conduct in commercial contexts is often not necessarily
specified as illegal. See, e.g., Samuel W. Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1971, 1978–80 (2006). Moreover, the law is often unsuccessful in setting clear boundaries
along the continuum of unethical to illegal behavior. This Article is not focused on all
possible instances of misconduct; nor is its goal to write a code of conduct that defines
specific acts that are or should be considered illegal or unethical. Rather, this Article’s goal
is to draw regulators’ attention to the way in which information-distorting conduct has the
potential to disrupt economic stability and therefore presents a “macroprudential” concern.
See BEVERLEY HIRTLE ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 409,
MACROPRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: LESSONS FROM THE SCAP 1
(2009).
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discipline and regulatory supervision. At a minimum, misconduct can give
rise to a range of social and economic costs by, for example, depressing
market confidence or disrupting liquidity. On that view, much like the
balance sheet risks that receive so much attention, financial misconduct is
also a safety and soundness issue that bank regulators worldwide should
seek to address.
This is a critical time to reevaluate the optimal design of banking
regulation. Five years have passed since national bank regulators convened
in the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision and agreed to the third
Basel Accord (“Basel III”), a regime designed to reduce the systemic risks
that banks pose.6 Pursuant to Basel III’s heightened standards, national
bank regulators have steadily implemented its new capital and liquidity
requirements—rules that increase banks’ equity cushion against (potential)
financial shocks. These operate as a prophylactic of sorts to guard against
the possibility of another financial-domino type crisis.7 Yet Basel III offers
no comparably concrete standards for regulating banking conduct, leaving
global markets exposed to a significant source of material risk and a lack of
internationally coordinated standards to address it. Now, in 2016,
regulators are becoming increasingly concerned about filling this gap.8
This Article’s goal is to motivate and inform a redesign of the existing
regulatory regime to squarely address misconduct as an ongoing marketwide risk. To that end, Parts I and II build a framework for understanding
misconduct as a distinct category of risk to the financial system:
“misconduct risk.”9 This framework has two components. First, the
the intentional distortion of
framework defines misconduct risk:
information that, when aggregated and synchronized across institutions,
undermines market safety and soundness. Part I illustrates this definition
with two case studies. The first case is the Crisis, which was triggered by
an asset bubble. By illustrating the role of misconduct in the subprime
mortgage bubble, Part I sheds light on the way in which misconduct can
contribute to a systemic banking crisis. The second case is the London
Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) scandal, in which banks colluded to
6. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS 54–57 (2010; revised
2011) [hereinafter BASEL III], http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf [perma.cc/NP78-338P].
The Dodd-Frank Act authorized regulators to enact stricter standards on large global banks.
See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform
Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1059
(2012).
7. These rules require banks to maintain a certain amount of capital (equity) at all times
(as a percentage of their outstanding liabilities). See Viral V. Acharya & Matthew
Richardson, Causes of the Financial Crisis, 21 CRITICAL REV. 195, 198 (2009).
8. See, e.g., ESRB REPORT ON MISCONDUCT, supra note 3; FAIR AND EFFECTIVE
MARKETS REVIEW, supra note 3; G30 CONDUCT AND CULTURE REPORT, supra note 4.
9. Although the concept of misconduct risk is original to the author, the Financial
Stability Board and the European Systemic Risk Board also began using the term in a similar
fashion while this Article was in draft. See ESRB REPORT ON MISCONDUCT, supra note 3;
FIN. STABILITY BD., MEASURES TO REDUCE MISCONDUCT RISK: PROGRESS REPORT (2015),
http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/Misconduct-risk-progress-report.pdf
[perma.cc/7LPZ-WS97].
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manipulate an international interest rate benchmark. The LIBOR case
shows that, even short of full-blown crises, misconduct can have systemwide consequences. LIBOR also serves as an important reminder that
misconduct has not been sufficiently addressed since the Crisis and
therefore still could theoretically manifest in another systemic crisis if
perpetrated in a different set of market and economic circumstances. Both
cases, though examples of different kinds of market distortions, assumed a
systemic quality largely because the misconduct spread among large
financial institutions.
Accordingly, the second part of the framework provides a theory for why
misconduct spreads so readily in the global banking sector. Part II focuses
on three structural features of banks that have the potential to operate in
tandem as a misconduct contagion. The first is a deficiency in internal
accountability systems at the managing director level and where complexity
is concerned.
Here, because professional consequences can be
disconnected from bad behavior, junior and mid-level bankers who are
peripherally engaged in (or prone toward) profit-motivated misconduct are
able to move freely among institutions. The second feature builds on the
first and relates to the performance-based compensation structure that has
become the industry standard. This compensation system can skew
incentives, making the upside of misconduct loom larger than the estimated
downside. Overall, weak accountability combined with performance-based
compensation can make misconduct seem like a rational choice on an
industry-wide basis.
The third feature relates to the fluid and transient nature of the banking
labor market, in which bankers and traders move freely and frequently
among institutions, building networks in the process. Ultimately, the highly
networked nature of the banking sector creates an environment conducive to
disseminating business norms through influence, which can, in certain
situations, spread a social license for misconduct by making deviance
normal. In identifying these mechanisms, this Article moves beyond the
current regulatory debate that generally acknowledges misconduct as a
problem and theorizes the structural and institutional drivers of systemically
significant misconduct.
The framework set out in Parts I and II provides a foundation to critique
the current architecture of global banking regulation as insufficiently
addressed to misconduct risk. Part III begins with this critique: that Basel
relies too heavily on quantitative risk management to deal with balance
sheet risks and pays scant attention to misconduct risk. It then offers a
solution for rebalancing this regime. Designing a regulatory tool that is
likely to be effective in reducing misconduct risk requires a careful
assessment of regulators’ abilities and weaknesses when it comes to
preventing misconduct. As compared to the banks themselves, regulators
have less expertise, information, and resources required to understand how
and where banks are vulnerable to misconduct. By contrast, regulators,
through their supervisory tools, have the ability to activate the private
market and harness its resources.
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Based on that comparative assessment, Part III proposes a novel
regulatory tool—what I call “compliance stress testing”—for incorporating
misconduct-related goals into the existing regime of global bank regulation.
Compliance stress testing draws on both quantitative and qualitative
methods of existing stress tests. The process involves regulators gathering
information from banks about their existing compliance programs and
requiring banks to respond to scenario-based exercises designed to identify
their vulnerabilities to misconduct risk. In a broad sense, the argument for
compliance stress testing responds to other scholars who seek a more robust
discussion of compliance in legal academic literature.10 In a narrower
sense, however, the specific proposal to enhance regulatory supervision
over banks’ compliance parts ways from other scholars who have viewed
the intervention of government regulators in corporate compliance with
skepticism.11
This Article concludes with a blueprint for achieving international
coordination around this new supervisory tool. Focusing on the Basel
Committee as a key fulcrum for national regulatory action, Part III urges
Basel to incorporate compliance stress testing into the Basel III regime.12
To overcome the political economy obstacles to coordination over new
regulatory goals, this Article proposes that the Basel Committee use riskweighted capital ratios—specifically, the discretion to reduce them—as
carrots to spur states to adopt compliance stress testing.
Using capital to motivate states’ regulatory action has two main benefits.
The principal benefit is that it strengthens Basel’s standards for reducing
misconduct risk and coordinates adoption of those standards. An ancillary
benefit is the possibility to lessen the externalities that the current level of
capital restrictions has caused.13 Broadly speaking, this prescription for
using Basel’s capital rules to coordinate international regulatory behavior
suggests that this informal institution of international financial regulation is
more powerful than others have thought14: it has the potential to structure
incentives among sovereign states, which can lead to desirable regulatory
10. See, e.g., GEOFFREY PARSONS MILLER, THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE, RISK
MANAGEMENT, AND COMPLIANCE (2014).
11. See, e.g., Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV.
949 (2009); Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance (unpublished
manuscript) (May 31, 2015) (on file with author). But see Kristin N. Johnson, Addressing
Gaps in the Dodd-Frank Act: Directors’ Risk Management Oversight Obligations, 45 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 55, 92–100 (2011) (arguing that Dodd-Frank did not go far enough in
regulating compliance).
12. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, 40
STAN. J. INT’L L. 283, 285 (2004) (conceptualizing “new sovereignty” as “the capacity to
participate in the international and transgovernmental regimes, networks, and institutions
that are now necessary to allow governments to accomplish through cooperation with one
another what they could once only hope to accomplish acting alone within a defined
territory”); see also HAL S. SCOTT & ANNA GELPERN, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE:
TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATION (20th ed. 2014).
13. See infra Part III.B (discussing the possible decline in liquidity and growth of
shadow banking system that has followed increased capital requirements).
14. See, e.g., CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE
MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2d ed. 2015).
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convergence. In making this proposal, this Article joins other scholars who
have argued that Basel’s current one-size-capital-fits-all approach is neither
the most economically efficient nor the most prudentially sound.15
Ultimately, conceptualizing misconduct risk as a distinct category of risk
to the financial system should prompt bank regulators, like central banks, to
more readily embrace the need for new tools to supervise banking conduct.
Moreover, the specific tool that this Article proposes shows that regulators
can effectively and efficiently incorporate misconduct risk into existing
regulatory frameworks.16
I. THE CONCEPT OF MISCONDUCT RISK
After the Crisis, financial regulation in the world’s most significant
financial economies pivoted toward a “macroprudential approach.”17
Whereas prior to the Crisis, regulation was concerned principally with firmlevel stability, the post-Crisis framework has become much more mindful
of how regulation should be designed to address threats to the “financial
Among other things, this macroprudential
system as a whole.”18
philosophy stimulated intense attention to the myriad sources of systemic
risk. Not surprisingly, as the focus on systemic risk has grown, so too has
the debate over the definition of that term.
Classically, systemic risk was viewed as the possibility that institutional
distress—traditionally, a bank failure—could have a domino-type effect,
leading to other firm failures and an overall contraction of the financial
system.19 More recently, scholars have entertained a slightly looser
15. See Roberta Romano, For Diversity in the International Regulation of Financial
Institutions: Critiquing and Recalibrating the Basel Architecture, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 1
(2014). Notably, however, Romano urges greater regulatory diversity within the Basel
regime, “challeng[ing] the present-day enthusiasm for international regulatory harmonization
and the notion that harmonization is a panacea for systemic risk.” Id. at 5.
16. Framing misconduct as a market failure that is caused by market participants’
strategic behavior also extends the classic debate on government intervention in markets and
relative transaction costs to the context of financial misconduct. See, e.g., A.C. PIGOU, THE
ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920) (discussing the theory of market failure); R.H. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (suggesting that transaction costs are lower
when private institutions, rather than government regulators, allocate resources).
17. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Implementing a Macroprudential Approach to Supervision and Regulation (May 5, 2011),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20110505a.pdf (explaining this
approach as one that “supplements traditional supervision and regulation of individual firms
or markets with explicit consideration of threats to the stability of the financial system as a
whole”) [perma.cc/M7CB-MQ53].
18. Samuel G. Hanson et al., A Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation, 25
J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 3, 3 (2011); see Anil K. Kashyap et al., The Macroprudential Toolkit,
59 IMF ECON. REV. 145 (2011).
19. See Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Complex Financial
Innovation, Complexity, and Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657, 664–65 (2012); Serafín
Martínez-Jaramillo et al., Systemic Risk, Financial Contagion and Financial Fragility, 34 J.
ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 2358, 2359 (2010) (conceptually modeling systemic risk as
involving “first, an initial random shock which affects . . . one or more financial institutions
and second, a contagion mechanism which transmits such negative effects to other
institutions on the system”); Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 204 (defining systemic risk as an
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definition of the term by including indirect threats to the proper functioning
of markets, which may not themselves cause bank failures or systemic
crises, but do increase the possibility of those outcomes.20 Under either
view, misconduct has been largely excluded.21
The goal of Part I is to draw attention to the ways in which misconduct
can give rise to the type of negative externalities that motivate post-Crisis
regulatory interventions on macroprudential (or systemic risk) grounds.22
Through the Crisis example, Part I.A sheds light on at least one link
between misconduct and classic systemic risk—namely, that misconduct
can contribute to asset bubbles, which may, in turn, lead to a systemic
banking crisis. In Part I.B, a second example, involving the manipulation
of LIBOR and the foreign exchange markets (“forex”), shows that
misconduct continues to manifest in various and unanticipated ways since
the Crisis, outmaneuvering the existing regulatory apparatus. Although
these later cases did not in the end result in systemic consequences, they
illustrate that the risk of such a seismic outcome continues to exist. Overall,
the examples in Part I help sharpen the distinction between misconduct risk
(a macro concern) and misconduct that is idiosyncratic, rogue, or
epiphenomenal.
economic shock that triggers a chain of institutional or market failures that results in an
increased cost of capital or decreased availability of capital).
20. See, e.g., Judge, supra note 19, at 659–60, 665 (defining complexity as systemic risk
and also noting that “the notion of what constitutes a ‘systemic risk’ has broadened”); Robert
C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, Systemically Significant Prices, 2 J. FIN. REG. (forthcoming
2016) (manuscript at 24) (on file with author), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2580078 (defining
key markets and prices as systemic risk) [perma.cc/EYL2-7U58]; Geoffrey P. Miller &
Gerald Rosenfeld, Intellectual Hazard: How Conceptual Bias in Complex Organizations
Contributed to the Crisis of 2008, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 807, 808 (2011) (defining
intellectual hazard as systemic risk).
21. For the body of legal and finance scholarship on systemic risk since the Crisis, see,
for example, Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an
Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1370–1412 (2011) (studying the
challenges of regulating systemic risks); John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms
and Shareholder Value, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 35, 35 (2014) (referring to systemic risks
posed by management practices); Coffee, Jr., supra note 6, at 1050 (suggesting that systemic
risk was a product of a “too big to fail” subsidy for large financial institutions); Julie A.D.
Manasfi, Systemic Risk and Dodd-Frank’s Volcker Rule, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 181,
205–11 (2013) (arguing that “the blending of commercial banking and investment banking
produce[s] . . . systemic risk”); Miller & Rosenfeld, supra note 20, at 808 (arguing that “the
tendency of behavioral biases to interfere with accurate thought and analysis within complex
organizations” is a source of systemic risk); Saule T. Omarova, The Merchants of Wall
Street: Banking, Commerce, and Commodities, 98 MINN. L. REV. 265, 343–46 (2013)
(suggesting that banks’ nontraditional activities pose systemic risks); Schwarcz, supra note
1, at 198–204 (offering the first scholarly definition of systemic risk); Daniel Schwarcz &
Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk in Insurance, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1569 (2014)
(studying previously unrecognized systemic risk in the insurance industry).
22. To be sure, not all bank misconduct generates macroprudential or systemic risk
concerns. “If a bank loses money from a risky investment, that is not systemic. But
institutional failure, market seizure, infrastructure breakdown[,] or even a sharp rise in the
cost of financial services can have serious adverse implications for many other market
participants. In these cases, there is a systemic dimension.” Jaime Caruana, Systemic Risk:
How to Deal With It?, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS (Feb. 2010), http://www.bis.org/publ/
othp08.htm#P1 [perma.cc/RZ4Z-WRWM].
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A. The 2008 Financial Crisis
Asset bubbles are one of the most common historical causes of systemic
crises, and misconduct has played a key role in some of these.23 The South
Sea Bubble of 1720 may be the earliest example of a severe market crash
precipitated by an asset bubble that was fueled by fraud and deception. In
the early eighteenth century, the English House of Lords gave the South Sea
Company a monopoly over South American trade, positioning it to rival the
East India Trading Company.24 The company’s business was, however,
“blighted from the outset”—saddled with insufficient experience, delivery
failure, and, eventually, war with Spain.25 In order to perpetuate the
illusion of profit, the company’s directors circulated “fanciful tales of South
Sea riches.”26 These false but “extravagant rumors”27 stoked demand for
the stock and incited a period of investor mania, driving the share’s value to
nearly ten times what it was probably worth.28 When the bubble finally
burst, individuals and institutions were ruined, and the Bank of England
was forced to bail out the company to spare the national economy from
debilitating harm.29
Fast-forwarding 275 years, the Crisis was similarly fueled by an asset
bubble.30 The conventional narrative of the Crisis is by now relatively
well-settled. As the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission succinctly
recounted,
[I]t was the collapse of the housing bubble—fueled by low interest rates,
easy and available credit, scant regulation, and toxic mortgages—that was
the spark that ignited a string of events, which led to a full-blown crisis in
the fall of 2008.31
23. See Erik F. Gerding, Laws Against Bubbles: An Experimental-Asset-Market
Approach to Analyzing Financial Regulation, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 977, 982 (noting that
“[e]conomists generally define asset-price bubbles as the divergence of the price of an asset
or asset class from its fundamental value”). See generally Markus K. Brunnermeier & Martin
Oehmke, Bubbles, Financial Crises, and Systemic Risk (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res.,
Working Paper No. 18398, 2012).
24. Ellen Castelow, South Sea Bubble, HISTORIC UK, http://www.historic-uk.com/
HistoryUK/HistoryofEngland/South-Sea-Bubble/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) [perma.cc/
6PEN-JDDX]; James Narron & David Skeie, Crisis Chronicles: The South Sea Bubble of
1720—Repackaging Debt and the Current Reach for Yield, FED. RESERVE BANK N.Y. (Nov.
8, 2013), http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2013/11/crisis-chronicles-the-southsea-bubble-of-1720repackaging-debt-and-the-current-reach-for-yield.html#.VX3TeflVhBc
[perma.cc/4WBF-D5VE].
25. See RICHARD DALE, THE FIRST CRASH: LESSONS FROM THE SOUTH SEA BUBBLE 49–
50 (2004).
26. South Sea Bubble Short History, HARV. BUS. SCH., http://www.library.hbs.edu/
hc/ssb/history.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) [perma.cc/72JR-W227].
27. DAVID E. Y. SARNA, HISTORY OF GREED: FINANCIAL FRAUD FROM TULIP MANIA TO
BERNIE MADOFF 25 (2010); see Castelow, supra note 24.
28. SARNA, supra note 27, at 25–26; South Sea Bubble Short History, supra note 26.
29. CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF WESTERN EUROPE 76 (1984).
30. See Eric S. Rosengren, Pres. & CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., Asset Bubbles and
Systemic Risk (Mar. 3, 2010), https://www.bostonfed.org/news/speeches/rosengren/2010/
030310 [perma.cc/7KKP-43YR].
31. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC
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The Crisis involved a secondary bubble as well, surrounding the
securities that large, global banks created from these toxic loans—
mortgaged-backed securities32 (MBS). Over the past several years,
scholars, policymakers, and commentators have offered various
explanations for the Crisis, which range from moral hazard to housing
policy.33 Among them is misconduct, insofar as misconduct played some
contributing role in both bubbles by loosening the credit supply and by
fueling supply and demand for (unsustainable) securitized mortgage
products.34
In particular, a body of research has emerged discussing the Crisis as a
“supply-side phenomenon,” that is, the byproduct of a significant loosening
of credit.35 As Alejandro Justiniano and his coauthors explained, “The
housing boom that preceded the Great Recession was the result of an
increase in credit supply driven by looser lending constraints in the
mortgage market.”36 Some scholars, courts, and commentators have since
concluded that misconduct contributed to this loosening.37 Blackburn and
CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES xvi (2011), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/
GPO-FCIC.pdf [perma.cc/Y8FX-2DT5].
32. See Judge, supra note 19, at 693 (noting that the Crisis was “two related but distinct
bubbles—one in real estate and a second in mortgage securities”).
33. See, e.g., Coffee, Jr., supra note 1, at 800 (arguing that a “too big to fail” subsidy
developed, which stoked moral hazard in big banks); see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger
Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 265–66 (2010) (showing empirically
that executive compensation gave rise to asymmetrical incentives and fueled excessive risk
taking); John B. Taylor, Getting Back on Track: Macroeconomic Policy Lessons from the
Financial Crisis, 92 FED. RESERVE BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 165, 166–67 (2010) (arguing that
departures in monetary policy from the so-called Taylor Rule led to build up of debt and
excessive risk taking); Norbert J. Michel, Government Policies Caused the Financial Crisis
and Made the Recession Worse, HERITAGE FOUND. (Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.heritage.org/
research/commentary/2015/1/government-policies-caused-the-financial-crisis-and-made-therecession-worse (discussing the role of housing policy and government-sponsored
enterprises in contributing to the bubble) [perma.cc/G5F7-35Q3]; Peter J. Wallison, Fannie,
Freddie Caused the Financial Crisis, AM. ENT. INST. (Nov. 25, 2011), https://www.aei.org/
publication/fannie-freddie-caused-the-financial-crisis (discussing the role of housing policy
in contributing to the bubble) [perma.cc/BU7H-JGZP].
34. See William C. Dudley, Pres. & CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Asset Bubbles
and the Implications for Central Bank Policy (Apr. 7, 2010), http://www.bis.org/
review/r100409c.pdf (noting that there were two innovations related to the housing boom:
“innovations . . . in housing finance, where subprime lending made mortgage credit available
to households that were much less creditworthy, and . . . in structured finance instruments
such as [CDOs]”) [perma.cc/QR8Q-8RWS].
35. Adam J. Levitan & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO.
L.J. 1177, 1181 (2012); see ALEJANDRO JUSTINIANO ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y.,
STAFF REPORT NO. 709, CREDIT SUPPLY AND THE HOUSING BOOM (2015).
36. JUSTINIANO ET AL., supra note 35, abstract.
37. See, e.g., McKinley L. Blackburn & Todd Vermilyea, The Prevalence and Impact of
Misstated Incomes on Mortgage Loan Applications, 21 J. HOUSING ECON. 151, 151 (2012)
(“One of the explanations that is commonly offered for the increased rates of lending in the
mid-2000s is a lack of diligence in documenting income on mortgage loan applications by
lending institutions.”); Atif R. Mian & Amir Sufi, Fraudulent Income Overstatement on
Mortgage Applications During the Credit Expansion of 2002 to 2005, at 14 (Kreisman
Working Paper Series in Housing L. & Pol’y, No. 21, 2015) (providing examples where “the
mortgage originator and buyer work together to commit fraud” and noting that “during the
mortgage credit expansion from 2002 to 2005, we know originators failed to monitor and
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Vermilyea, for example, provide one of the first academic studies “that
reflect[s] the degree to which incomes in mid-2000 home-purchase
mortgage loan applications were overstated relative to the true incomes of
mortgage applicants.”38
Likewise, a 2015 paper from Princeton economist Atif Mian and Chicago
Booth School’s Amir Sufi studied income falsification and its connection to
the subprime housing bubble.39 Consistent with the supply-side theory,
they concluded that “the expansion of credit in subprime zip codes was
more likely due to a fundamental credit supply shock than exogenous
increases in house price expectations in these neighborhoods,” which
created “vicious cycle[s] where a housing bubble pulled in even more
credit.”40 In part, they credit the correlation between this “boom-bust
cycle” and the subprime market to “fraudulent reporting of income[s],”
which “becomes more necessary when house prices are higher because of
the need to meet debt-to-income restrictions.”41
Although smaller banks and originators were involved in these practices,
so too were larger institutions. One internal memorandum to loan officers
at J.P. Morgan instructed: “If you do not get [approval], try resubmitting
with slightly higher income. Inch it up $500 to see if you can get the
findings you want. Do the same for assets.”42 For similar such conduct, the
screen potential borrowers” and that in some cases they “falsified income information by
borrowers without the borrowers’ knowledge”); see also Complaint ¶ 1, SEC v. J.P. Morgan
Securities LLC, No. 1:12-cv-01872 (RLW) (D.D.C. Nov. 16, 2012) (alleging that Bear,
Stearns & Co. did not disclose its practice “in connection with [residential] MBS offerings[]
of negotiating cash settlements with mortgage loan originators that violated the
representations, warranties, and covenants made to Bear by the originators after the loans
were securitized [and not] notifying the trusts that owned the loans”); Complaint ¶ 2, United
States v. Bank of America Corp., No. 12-cv-1422 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2012) (alleging
that Countrywide sold bad loans to Fannie and Freddie by “eliminat[ing] every significant
checkpoint on loan quality and compensated its employees solely based on the volume of
loans originated, leading to rampant instances of fraud and other serious loan defects, all
while Countrywide was informing the GSEs [Fannie and Freddie] that it, too, had tightened
its underwriting guidelines”); Complaint ¶ 1, FDIC v. Killinger, No. 2:11-cv-459 (W.D.
Wash. Mar. 16, 2011) (alleging that executives were “focused on short term gains to increase
their own compensation, with reckless disregard for WaMu’s longer term safety and
soundness”); Complaint ¶¶ 2–8, SEC v. Mozilo, No. CV09-03994 VBF AJWX (C.D. Cal.
June 4, 2009) (alleging that three Countrywide executives failed to disclose the risks
associated with their underwriting practices and the fact that its business model, which
depended on selling its loans into the secondary mortgage market, was unsustainable); Chris
Dolmetsch & Dakin Campbell, U.S. Files Civil Mortgage Fraud Suit Against Wells Fargo,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-10-09/us-files-civil-mortgage-fraud-suit-against-wells-fargo
[perma.cc/E6PD-63ND];
Shayndi
Raice, Jury Decides Against BofA on ‘Hustle’ Program, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 23, 2013),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303615304579153900661389242
[perma.cc/4TW7-FDYA]; Landon Thomas Jr., Jury Finds Bank of America Liable in
Mortgage Case, N.Y. TIMES: DEALB%K (Oct. 23, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2013/10/23/jury-finds-bank-of-america-liable-in-mortgage-case-nicknamed-the-hustle/?_r=0
(reporting on the Bank of America “HSSL” program) [perma.cc/C4F5-TJVN].
38. Blackburn & Vermilyea, supra note 37, at 152.
39. See Mian & Sufi, supra note 37.
40. Id. at 31.
41. Id. at 32.
42. Blackburn & Vermilyea, supra note 37, at 151.
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Federal Reserve Bank (“the Fed”) assessed an $85 million civil penalty
against Wells Fargo; its employees had allegedly “falsified income
information in mortgage applications.”43 As the New York Times reported,
“Some of the nation’s largest lenders, including Countrywide, Wells
Fargo[,] and Ameriquest,44 overstated the income of borrowers—without
telling them—to qualify them for larger loans than they could afford.”45
The result was a sizable (oversized) body of so-called “toxic” subprime
loans, which large financial institutions desired as the “raw material[s]” for
their “mortgage machine”46—the creation of MBS and financial products
structured from these MBS,47 like collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).
Here, too, in the market for securitized mortgage products, misconduct
may have played a role in exacerbating the Crisis. In some cases, bankers
failed to adequately perform due diligence with respect to the loans they
were including in their securitized and structured products or with respect to
the mortgage originators and their practices. At least two international
banks, Nomura and the Royal Bank of Scotland, were found by Judge
Denise Cote to have enticed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to buy mortgage
securities by misrepresenting (or not fully disclosing) the risks associated
with the underlying collateral.48 Under federal securities law, Regulation
AB requires disclosure of the originators’ practices and a description of the
underwriting criteria.49 Yet, in that case, Nomura “failed to subject
thousands of the loans at issue . . . to genuine credit or valuation diligence,
opting instead to use less expensive screening mechanisms. And once the

43. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. (July 20, 2011),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/enforcement/20110720a.htm
[perma.cc/3NDT-2KEJ]; see Order to Cease and Desist and Order of Assessment of a Civil
Money Penalty Issued Upon Consent, In re Wells Fargo & Co., Nos. 11-094-B-HC1, 11094-I-HC1, 11-094-B-HC2, 11-094-I-HC2 (July 20, 2011).
44. As the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission noted, fraud at institutions like
Ameriquest (a California-based subprime lender) was “emulated” throughout the industry.
FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 31, at 12. These practices included inflating home
appraisals, misleading investors about the nature of their interest rates, or switching the
interest rates altogether. Id.
45. Binyamin Appelbaum, How Mortgage Fraud Made the Financial Crisis Worse,
N.Y. TIMES: UPSHOT (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/13/upshot/howmortgage-fraud-made-the-financial-crisis-worse.html?_r=0 [perma.cc/2E3V-EEYF]. This is
not to suggest that borrowers had no fault; in many cases, they were complicit.
46. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 31, at 102–03.
47. Robert Khuzami, director of the SEC’s Enforcement Division, has stated that
“mortgage products such as [residential] MBS were ground zero in the financial crisis” and
that “[m]isrepresentations in connection with the creation and sale of mortgage securities
contributed greatly to the tremendous losses suffered by investors once the U.S. housing
market collapsed.” Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges J.P. Morgan & Credit Suisse with
Misleading Investors in RMBS Offerings (Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/News/
PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171486012#.VSP_qfnF940 [perma.cc/RH8L-RG9U].
48. Fed. Housing Fin. Agency v. Nomura Holding Am., Inc., 104 F. Supp. 3d 441, 537
(S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2015) (“[T]he origination and securitization of these defective loans not
only contributed to the collapse of the housing market, the very macroeconomic factor that
defendants say caused the losses, but once that collapse started, improperly underwritten
loans were hit hardest and drove the collapse even further.”).
49. 17 C.F.R. § 229.110 (2014).

2016]

MISCONDUCT RISK

1571

loans were on Nomura’s books . . . [it] performed no further diligence.”50
The court also referred to the Royal Bank of Scotland’s diligence as
“perfunctory.”51
In many cases, however, the banks’ (or, more precisely, certain bankers’)
conduct may not have been illegal. Even so, the bankers’ behavior may
have been an unethical breach of their professional duty to ensure the
integrity of the information that their clients and counterparties were relying
on to make financial decisions. There are several known examples of this
kind of misconduct. One journalist, Felix Salmon, documented the practice
of third-party diligence, which a company called Clayton Holdings
frequently performed.52 After a bank obtained a pool of mortgages,
Clayton would re-diligence a representative sample.53 In one case, for
example, even though Clayton rejected 45 percent of the loans in the
sample, the bank did not perform further diligence on the remaining loans
or pass this information on to investors.54 Based on his research, Salmon
concluded, “[I]t [is] clear that the banks had price-sensitive information on
the quality of the loan pool which they failed to pass on to investors in that
pool.”55
In one case (and there appears to be more),56 traders at Citigroup were
alleged to have committed securities fraud in connection with the
structuring and marketing of a CDO “squared”—a synthetic CDO that
contains a credit default swap (CDS) that references other CDOs.57 The
product was structured and marketed in 2007, when the housing market had
already begun to decline.58 Aware of the direction the market was headed,
Citigroup allegedly decided to take a short position in the CDO by buying
protection against it.59 Despite the fact that it was betting against the very
assets it had selected, Citigroup allegedly failed to disclose that fact to
investors.60 Ultimately, the investors in the CDOs lost all of their principal
investment.61 The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
brought a civil securities fraud suit against Citigroup, which it settled for

50. Nomura, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 470.
51. Id.
52. Felix Salmon, The Enormous Mortgage-Bond Scandal, REUTERS (Oct. 13, 2010),
http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/10/13/the-enormous-mortgage-bond-scandal
[perma.cc/36VA-MCPQ].
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. Id.
56. U.S. SENATE, PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON HOMELAND
SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A
FINANCIAL CRISIS 330 (2011), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov//imo/media/doc/Financial_
Crisis/FinancialCrisisReport.pdf?attempt=2 [perma.cc/SR9E-B5Q3].
57. Complaint, SEC v. Stoker ¶ 1, No. 11-cv-7388 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2011).
58. Id.
59. See id. ¶¶ 17–18, 23–34.
60. See id. ¶ 60.
61. See id. ¶ 77.
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$285 million (and without admitting misconduct).62 Again, even assuming
the Citigroup traders’ behavior was consistent with the letter of the
securities law, the distortion of information involved was probably
unethical and certainly had economically distorting effects.
This sketch of the Crisis and the various kinds (and degrees) of
misconduct involved is in no way intended as a comprehensive accounting
of the misbehavior that took place in the run-up to the Crisis. Rather, this
brief sampling is offered to illustrate the systemic quality of misconduct
involved: by spreading broadly across institutions, fraud and other forms of
information distortion can exacerbate bubbles and contribute to dangerous
risk correlation by amplifying and synchronizing demand for an
unsustainable asset.63
B. LIBOR
As William Dudley of the New York Fed has noted, “The pattern of bad
behavior did not end with the Crisis, but continued despite the considerable
public sector intervention that was necessary to stabilize the financial
system.”64 The following case study of the manipulation of the LIBOR
benchmark and forex illustrates that even short of contributing to crises,
misconduct can nonetheless assume systemic significance by imposing
other social and economic costs on market participants and the real
economy. The case also underscores that misconduct risk is an evolving
and shape-shifting problem. As misconduct continues to manifest in
various (even unexpected) ways, the existing regulatory framework must
also adapt, both to reduce the costs on third parties that misconduct imposes
and to minimize the possibility that misconduct will contribute to another
systemic event.
LIBOR is an interest rate benchmark that is one of the most important
indices in the world. Trillions of dollars of assets and loans are pegged to
this rate and it serves as the basis for public and private contracts
worldwide.65 For these reasons, Robert Hockett and Saule Omarova have
referred to LIBOR as a “systemically significant price” that demands
enhanced prudential regulation on par with that imposed on systemically

62. See Chad Bray, Judge Unloads on Deal SEC Struck with Citi, WALL STREET J.,
(Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405297020422460457702856
4166670848 [perma.cc/A8FB-PZ6N].
63. Risk correlation—where large financial institutions pursue the same asset strategy—
implies that the failure of one will result in the distress of the others, like a chain of
“financial dominos.” Coffee, Jr., supra note 6, at 1057; see also Richard Squire, Shareholder
Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1151, 1156–63 (2010) (arguing
that firms engage in “correlation-seeking” by incurring contingent debt that correlates with
its insolvency risk).
64. William C. Dudley, Pres. & CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks at the
Workshop on Reforming Culture and Behavior in the Financial Services Industry (Oct. 20,
2014), http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2014/dud141020a.html [perma.cc/
Z85U-5DEP].
65. The Rotten Heart of Finance, ECONOMIST (July 7, 2012), http://www.
economist.com/node/21558281 [perma.cc/4U34-GJR3].
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important institutions.66 To compile the rate, the British Bankers’
Association (BBA) would ask a panel of six or more large international
banks each day: “[A]t what rate could you borrow funds [in the interbank
market] just prior to 11 [a.m.]?”67 The methodology was simple and clean,
albeit based in a loose honor system, as banks were not required to
substantiate their answers. In 2012, the public discovered that several of
the large contributing banks had manipulated the benchmark—beginning as
early as 2005.68
Traders manipulated these rates for two different reasons. The first was
for profit—small changes in the LIBOR rate could yield substantial swings
in profit, given the notional value of many contracts that used the LIBOR
rate.69 The other reason was to inflate institutional health during the
troubled Crisis years. There was a (not unfounded) fear that if a bank was
perceived as weak—unable to raise funds in the interbank market—it might
fall prey to runs, the likes of which had claimed Bear Stearns.70 It was for
that reason that one Barclays manager told a submitter not to “stick its head
above the parapet.”71
To those ends, traders colluded with others inside and outside of their
firms to manipulate the daily submissions. Many exchanges were captured
in emails and instant messaging and provide a startling window into the
norms and camaraderie that arose from manipulating these rates. Messages
show how traders not only condoned, but encouraged, one another and
created a certain cachet around making money by cheating.
In one series of exchanges, for instance, a Barclays trader in New York
requested to a Barclays trader in London:
This is the [book’s] risk. We need low 1M and 3M libor. Pls ask
[submitter] to get 1M set to 82. That would help a lot.72

Submitters, who ultimately received the traders’ requests, would
frequently agree to such requests:
For you . . . anything . . . .73
66. See Hockett & Omarova, supra note 20.
67. WHEATLEY REVIEW OF LIBOR: FINAL REPORT 61 (2012) [hereinafter WHEATLEY
REVIEW],
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
191762/wheatley_review_libor_finalreport_280912.pdf [perma.cc/63SD-CTJR]; see Gabriel
Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, Index Theory: The Law, Promise, and Failure of Financial
Indices, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 16–17 (2013).
68. See WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 67, at 81.
69. See Dan Awrey, The Limits of Private Ordering Within Modern Financial Markets,
34 REV. OF BANKING & FIN. L. 183, 228 (2014); Jesse Colombo, This New Libor ‘Scandal’
Will Cause a Terrifying Financial Crisis, FORBES (June 3, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/jessecolombo/2014/06/03/this-new-libor-scandal-will-cause-a-terrifying-financial-crisis
[perma.cc/4SFL-BCU5].
70. Awrey, supra note 69, at 229.
71. Id. (quoting settlement with the U.K. Financial Services Authority).
72. Complaint at 9, In re Barclays PLC, Order Instituting Proceedings Pursuant to
Sections 6(c) and 6(d) of the Company Exchange Act, as Amended, Making Findings and
Imposing Remedial Sanctions, CFTC No. 12-25 (June 27, 2012) (quoting a March 27, 2006,
exchange from a New York trader to a London trader).
73. Id. at 10 (quoting a March 16, 2006, exchange).
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Always happy to help, leave it with me, Sir.74

The Swiss bank UBS was also involved.75 The British Financial
Services Authority found that traders at UBS made over 1000 requests to
six different brokerage houses, and U.S. regulators found that UBS colluded
with at least four other banks that contributed to the LIBOR panel.76 In a
conversation between a UBS trader and a cash broker, the broker stated:
mate yur getting bloody good at this libor game . . . think of me when yur
on yur yacht in monaco wont yu.77

In another instance, one trader remarked: “Dude, I owe you big
time! . . . I’m opening a bottle of Bollinger.”78
The evidence shows that LIBOR manipulation had become well-known
and broadly accepted as normal at these global institutions.79 Indicative of
the norm, rate manipulation among large global banks extended beyond
LIBOR. Traders at these institutions were also discovered to have
manipulated the second most widely used benchmark, Euribor, as well as
the Swiss Franc London Interbank Offered Rate.80
Of particular note was the subsequent discovery of manipulation in the
exchange market for forex.81 Like LIBOR, the forex market is enormous
and touches trillions of dollars in transactions each day—in fact one
financial commentator has referred to the forex market as “the biggest and
the most interwoven one of them all.”82 Again, global banks including
Citigroup, J.P. Morgan, Barclays, the Royal Bank of Scotland, and possibly

74. Id. (quoting a March 20, 2006, exchange).
75. In addition to those institutions where employees were proven to have manipulated
LIBOR, others admitted attempts to manipulate it. See Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note
67, at 3.
76. Jill Treanor, UBS Libor Case Uncovers Tangled Web of Bank-Broker Relations,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 19, 2012, 4:15 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/dec/19/
ubs-libor-case-fine-emails [perma.cc/3XBN-RZGU].
77. Plea Agreement at 24, United States v. UBS AG, No. 3:15-cr-76 (D. Conn. May 20,
2015).
78. The Rotten Heart of Finance, supra note 65; see PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP,
THREATS TO THE FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR 16 (2014), https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/
financial-services/publications/assets/pwc-gecs-2014-threats-to-the-financial-servicessector.pdf (noting that “in the LIBOR case, employees [were] not encouraged to also
challenge social conformity”) [perma.cc/5AE8-34DP].
79. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, supra note 78, at 16.
80. See DAVID HOU & DAVID SKEIE, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO.
667, LIBOR: ORIGINS, ECONOMICS, CRISIS, SCANDAL, AND REFORM 3 (2014); Tom Fairless,
J.P. Morgan Fined by EU Regulators Over Rate Rigging, Operating Cartel, WALL STREET J.
(Oct. 21, 2014, 12:20 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/j-p-morgan-fined-by-eu-regulatorsover-rate-rigging-operating-cartel-1413896931 [perma.cc/9LZT-XH38].
81. See Chad Bray et al., Big Banks Are Fined $4.25 Billion in Inquiry into CurrencyRigging, N.Y. TIMES: DEALB%K (Nov. 12, 2014, 2:24 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2014/11/12/british-and-u-s-regulators-fine-big-banks-3-16-billion-in-foreign-exchangescandal [perma.cc/MN2G-GLR2]; Six Banks Fined £2.6bn by Regulators Over Forex
Failings, BBC NEWS (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-30016007
[perma.cc/ZKC5-NF2P].
82. Bray et al., supra note 81.
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In 2014,
UBS were involved in the manipulative misconduct.83
government authorities uncovered that traders at these banks had been
colluding to fix the prices of particular currencies for higher profits.84
And again, the conduct was not only collusive, but also collaborative and
collegial.85 By one account, a Citigroup trader made a profit of $99,000 in
thirty-three seconds by coordinating with other brokers over a series of
trades in the euro against the dollar.86 That trader worked with other traders
to build up his book of trades, which enabled him to increase the price at a
critical point in time when prices are set—known as the “fix”—above that
which the trader had been paying all day in the open market.87 And traders
at other firms helped the Citigroup trader do this.88
This misconduct arguably impaired the integrity and soundness of the
global financial markets in at least two different ways. First, manipulating
the benchmarks distorted the market equilibrium of numerous contracts.
With trillions of dollars in derivatives, swaps, and loans referencing LIBOR
alone, manipulating rates necessarily had consequences in the real
economy.89 Perhaps most obviously, a falsely inflated LIBOR rate meant
that any debt instrument in the world that referenced LIBOR as its
benchmark became more expensive for the borrower—but not by the
invisible hand of free market forces. More broadly, as Hockett and
Omarova suggest, by exploiting their influence over benchmarks, financial
institutions can distort the “‘natural’ long-term equilibrium” that the market
expects, causing other market actors to engage in a socially suboptimal
number of transactions, in transactions on unfair or inefficient terms, or to
interact in the marketplace in irrational or destabilizing ways when their
suspicions of rate rigging are eventually confirmed.90
Second, the fines imposed for wrongdoing may have weakened the
culpable—but systemically important—banks. In the past few years alone,

83. See Michael Corkery & Ben Protess, Rigging of Foreign Exchange Market Makes
Felons of Top Banks, N.Y. TIMES: DEALB%K (May 20, 2015, 11:25 AM), http://www.
nytimes.com/2015/05/21/business/dealbook/5-big-banks-to-pay-billions-and-plead-guilty-incurrency-and-interest-rate-cases.html?_r=0 [perma.cc/MTW9-5HXT].
84. See Sebastian Chrispin, Forex Scandal: How to Rig the Market, BBC (May 20,
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-26526905 [perma.cc/4L2L-3UYP].
85. In his annual Mansion House speech in the city of London, Bank of England
Governor Mark Carney remarked that “[u]nethical behavior went unchecked, proliferated[,]
and eventually became the norm.” Caroline Binham & Martin Arnold, Bank of England
Governor Mark Carney to Extend Market Abuse Rules, FIN. TIMES (June 11, 2015, 7:14
AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d24ce466-0f8b-11e5-b968-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3
x49A8O00 [perma.cc/WM9D-UK8G].
86. See Bray et al., supra note 81.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Some have pointed out that the upward manipulation of LIBOR increased mortgage
rates, adding to the debt burden of homeowners with adjustable-rate-mortgages. See, e.g.,
CHRIS LAUER, UNDERWATER: OPTIONS WHEN YOUR MORTGAGE IS UPSIDE DOWN 152
(2012); see also ERIC L. TALLEY, FINANCIAL REGULATION AND THE WORLD’S MOST
IMPORTANT NUMBER: LIBOR REPORTING BEHAVIOR DURING THE CREDIT CRISIS 33 (2014)
(on file with author) (discussing market implications of the LIBOR rate-fixing scandal).
90. Hockett & Omarova, supra note 20, at 10–11.
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UBS was fined £940 million for its role in LIBOR;91 Deutsche Bank, also
for its role in LIBOR, paid £227 million to the U.K.’s Financial Conduct
Authority, $775 million to the U.S. Department of Justice, $800 million to
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and $600 million to the New
York Department of Financial Services;92 UBS, J.P. Morgan Chase, HSBC,
and the Royal Bank of Scotland, collectively, paid $4.25 billion in fines to
U.S., British, and Swiss regulators for their involvement in forex
rigging93—and the list goes on.94
The weight of these fines—to say nothing of the related litigation
expenses—has invariably cut into banks’ earnings and challenged them to
keep up with their regulatory capital requirements. As the European
Systemic Risk Board has found in connection with the largest European
banks, “Past fines and ones in the near future erase all the capital issued by
EU globally systemically important banks (G-SIBs) during the last five
years. The Common Equity Tier 1 ratios of these banks would be, on
average, around two percentage points higher without such fines.”95 And as
the results of the Fed’s 2014 supervisory stress tests show, losses associated
with “operational risk” (most of which related to litigation losses) for
twenty-five U.S. banks was about $150 billion over nine quarters.96 This
suggests that misconduct-related fines directly impede banks’ ability to
fortify their balance sheets against economic shocks as the post-Crisis
framework intends.97 And to the extent that fines cause a bank to struggle
to meet these capital requirements, the fines invariably divert the bank’s
resources from other operational priorities, such as information
infrastructure, internal compliance, and productive innovation.
II. A THEORY OF CONTAGION
The burden of Part I was to anchor the concept of misconduct risk: the
possibility that misconduct, when widespread among financial institutions,
gives rise to significant social and economic costs. It urged that in these
cases, misconduct is a macro (market-wide) risk that requires regulatory
intervention—because the negative externalities that result from misconduct
risk are neither concentrated in, nor fully internalized by, the individual
institutions involved. From that vantage point, just as regulators are
91. See Treanor, supra note 76.
92. See Deutsche Bank Pays Record Fine for LIBOR Manipulation, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 23,
2015, 6:43 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ccf7af08-e904-11e4-a71a-00144feab7de.
html#axzz3ZZf0E9Ao [perma.cc/59JA-LGYC].
93. See Bray et al., supra note 81.
94. The Wall Street Journal reported that the six largest U.S. bank holding companies
have paid nearly $130 billion in fines, settlements, and other costs related to the Crisis and
mortgages. Justin Baer, Top Wall Street Lawyer Slams Regulatory Environment, WALL
STREET J. (Mar. 18, 2015, 6:49 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/top-wall-street-lawyerslams-regulatory-environment-1426718956 [perma.cc/HER2-7EJK].
95. ESRB REPORT ON MISCONDUCT, supra note 3, at 14–15.
96. G30 CONDUCT AND CULTURE REPORT, supra note 4, at 20.
97. See Ryan Tracy et al., Fed Lifts Capital Requirements for Banks, WALL STREET J.
(July 20, 2015, 8:29 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-set-to-finalize-amount-of-capitalbig-banks-must-maintain-1437410401 [perma.cc/RDB2-BUP8].
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concerned about the mechanisms that transmit balance sheet distress
between banks, so too should they be worried about the mechanisms that
spread or synchronize misconduct in the banking sector.98
Building on the case studies explored in Part I, Part II provides the
second component of a framework for understanding misconduct risk.
Specifically, Part II explores several possible structural or institutional
reasons why misconduct risk arises. First, Part II.A discusses three features
of the banking sector that can enable misconduct on an industry-wide basis.
Then, Part II.B explores the advantages of a regulatory strategy that targets,
ex ante, structural sources of contagious misconduct.
A. Interbank Contagion
What follows is a discussion of three structural or institutional aspects of
the banking sector: deficiencies in accountability, performance-based
compensation, and the homogenous and hyperfluid nature of the banker
labor market. These features are likely to be key drivers of misconduct risk
because, together in interaction, they have the potential to first incentivize,
and then spread, misconduct across the financial services industry.
1. Accountability
As a baseline, there may be certain deficiencies in accountability in the
banking sector that decrease the likelihood that regulators or firm
management will detect misconduct that goes on in deal teams or on trading
floors. Though not an exhaustive list, two such deficiencies stand out: the
lack of hierarchical responsibility at the managing director level and
insufficient individual responsibility in connection with complex financial
activities.
a. Hierarchy
In general, banking lacks a formalized structure for holding managing
directors responsible for the conduct of analysts, associates, and vice
presidents below them. Consider recent scandals involving the sale of MBS
in the Crisis and the false submissions in LIBOR. Legal accountability for
the misconduct in those cases tended to concentrate at two ends of the
hierarchical spectrum—with firm managers, like bank CEOs, at one end
and relatively junior level bankers at the other.99 One important question is
whether the managing directors who were not directly involved, but must

98. See Hal S. Scott, Interconnectedness and Contagion—Financial Panics and the Crisis
of 2008 (June 26, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2178475
(providing a comprehensive analysis of contagion and interconnectedness in the Crisis)
[perma.cc/9KS5-Q9B2].
99. See, e.g., Mark Broad, LIBOR Trader: Who Is Tom Hayes?, BBC NEWS (Aug. 3,
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-33635340 [perma.cc/7KAM-6EAQ]; Former
Barclays Employees Named in LIBOR Criminal Case, BBC NEWS (Feb. 17, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-26228635 [perma.cc/86EK-GX3P].
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have (at least informally) signed off on this conduct, still remain in their
jobs.100
To the extent that banks did not hold managing directors accountable for
the misconduct that they sanctioned or acknowledged during the Crisis or
rate-fixing scandals, such lapse may reflect a lack of an industry-wide
structure, policy, or ethical code that presumes managing directors are
responsible for the conduct of their subordinates. Instead, accountability
may still be too fractured insofar as mid-level managers, like managing
directors, are not systematically subject to serious professional or
reputational consequences if and when their subordinates engage in
misconduct.
Such disconnect in professional responsibility may be unique to the
banking profession. Other skill-based professions, like law or medicine,
recognize that senior practitioners are responsible (either formally or
informally) for the professional choices of their less experienced junior
colleagues. In the practice of law, for example, well-established rules of
professional conduct hold senior attorneys ethically responsible for the
actions of their subordinates.101 In a similar ethos, medical doctors begin as
residents and hone their skills under the supervision and guidance of
attending physicians. These supervising physicians are not just technical
teachers, but also guide their subordinates with respect to ethical questions
or conflicts.102 But in finance, as much a profession that deals in public
trust as law and medicine, similar hierarchical accountability appears
sparse.
b. Complexity
Accountability may also be deficient where complexity is concerned—
and a good deal of banking today is highly complex.103 Broadly speaking,
banks’ transactions today are multifaceted and multilayered. Deals
typically involve multiple teams within a bank and multiple bankers on
each team. It is rare in high finance today for any one (or two or three)
individual to have ownership for all of the work streams in a transaction.
While there may be a figurehead nominally running the deal, no one single
banker is likely to be intimately familiar with all of its moving pieces.
Consequently, when the big picture suggests that the transaction was tainted
100. See Liam Vaughan & Gavin Finch, Was Tom Hayes Running the Biggest Financial
Conspiracy in History?, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Sept. 14, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2015-09-14/was-tom-hayes-running-the-biggest-financial-conspiracy-inhistory- [perma.cc/4PUY-J7TQ].
101. See, e.g., N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.1.
102. See Tara JT Kennedy et al., Clinical Oversight: Conceptualizing the Relationship
Between Supervision and Safety, 22 SOC’Y GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1080, 1080–81 (2007);
Julie R. Rosenbaum et al., Sources of Ethical Conflict in Medical Housestaff Training: A
Qualitative Study, 116 AM. J. MED. 402 (2004).
103. See Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation, and the Regulation of Modern Financial
Markets, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235 (2012); Kathryn Judge, Interbank Discipline, 60 UCLA
L. REV. 1262, 1275–77 (2013) (discussing the rise of banks’ complexity); Judge, supra note
19.
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with misrepresentation, omission, or manipulation, it can be difficult for
management or regulators to hold individuals accountable, each of whom
played only some small, nondispositive role.
This diffusion of responsibility is perhaps most apparent in structured
finance. Recall that structured finance was at the heart of the Crisis. It
involved an asset bubble surrounding securitized mortgages, whereby banks
packaged subprime mortgages into securities and then further packaged
those securities into products like CDOs and CDS. That process did not
end with the Crisis—structured finance is alive and well today, while
securitization is still a bread-and-butter process for banks.104
And such complex financial activity wears accountability thin. Not only
does structured finance typically involve multiple layers of deal teams—all
contributing their parts along the assembly line—but it also involves
multiple stakeholders on the other side of the deal. As Kate Judge has
written, securitized products (and CDOs) “transform[]” traditional bilateral
relationships between assets and investors into something more dispersed—
fragmented, as she terms it—in a way that increases and disperses the
At each stage in the structuring and
counterparties involved.105
restructuring process, counterparties become more removed from the
underlying collateral, and therefore their incentives to gather information
and monitor asset quality is further and further reduced.106 The result,
overall, is a system of scattered responsibility on the securitization side
combined with low levels of monitoring on the investor side, making any
one individual banker’s perception of responsibility minimal at best.
Indeed, the notion that the length of the “chain” is inversely related to
accountability also finds support in the research of Alan Morrison, William
Wilhelm, and their coauthors.107 Their empirical work suggests that the
various technological shifts in the investment banking industry, which
increased arm’s length transactions, ultimately lowered institutions’
concern for their reputations of propriety.108
Together, these two accountability gaps—which flow from banks’
hierarchy and complexity—reduce the likelihood that misconduct will be
detected. By splintering responsibility for a transaction quite broadly,
complexity makes it difficult to allocate responsibility appropriately.
Again, this can reduce transparency, which, in turn, decreases the likelihood
that any one group of stakeholders—in the bank or on the buy side—is
sufficiently motivated to monitor for misconduct. Similarly, a lack of
hierarchical responsibility reduces the incentives for senior and experienced
bankers to invest sufficient professional resources (i.e., time, mental energy,
104. See, e.g., David McLaughlin et al., Auto Loan Securitization Probed by U.S., States,
Yates Says, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Feb. 24, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2015-02-24/justice-department-probing-auto-loan-securitization-yates-says
[perma.cc/XB4E-SDM7].
105. See Judge, supra note 19, at 676–77.
106. Id. at 698–99.
107. Alan D. Morrison et al., Investment Banking Relationships: 1933–2007 (May 8,
2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
108. Id. at 32.
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creativity) in monitoring their deal teams and trading desks. In the absence
of sufficient resources dedicated to and with a capacity for monitoring for
misconduct, bankers are more likely to estimate the risk that misconduct
will be detected as relatively low.
2. Compensation
If deficient accountability decreases the risks associated with engaging in
legally or ethically questionable behavior, the compensation structures in
banks can increase the potential reward. The homogeneity of the largest
global banks is key to understanding why. Bank holding companies like
Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley,109 Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche
Bank, HSBC, Bank of America, J.P. Morgan, and others have nearly
identical business lines: commercial banking, securities underwriting,
dealing and brokerage activities, investment management, and derivatives
business.110 As a result, these banks recruit from a relatively homogenous
labor pool of bankers and traders who are qualified with similar hard
(quantitative) and soft (interpersonal) skills.111
One byproduct of this homogeneity is an industry-wide standard of
performance-based compensation, wherein the bulk of compensation is paid
in the form of a discretionary annual bonus—rather than a fixed salary.
This discretionary bonus is based on performance; it reflects some
combination of how well the individual employee and the bank performed
over the course of the year. That compensation packages have become
standardized across big banks, in the performance-based model, should not
be surprising in light of their homogeneity: a compensation package that
achieves desired results in bank A (by motivating high performance) will
also be likely to have the same result in bank B. But performance-based
compensation can produce socially suboptimal results as well. Scholars
like Lucian Bebchuk and Holger Spamann have shown empirically that
performance-based compensation gives rise to a moral hazard that
To the extent bankers are
incentivizes excessive risk taking.112
compensated with equity, they argue, bankers have incentives “to take
gambles that have a negative present value but that, due to the insulation of
common shareholders from downside risks, carry a positive expected value
to these shareholders.”113

109. Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, both investment banks, converted to bank
holding companies during the Crisis.
110. See generally Citigroup Inc., Form 10-K (Feb. 20, 2015); Goldman Sachs Group,
Inc., Form 10-K (Feb. 25, 2015); HSBC USA Inc., Form 10-K (Feb. 23, 2015); J.P. Morgan
Chase & Co., Form 10-K (Feb. 24, 2015); Morgan Stanley, Form 10-K (Mar. 2, 2015).
111. KAREN HO, LIQUIDATED: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF WALL STREET 13 (2009) (writing
that that “elite universities [are] the only sites from which Wall Street investment banks
recruit and hire”).
112. Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 33.
113. Id. at 262.
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It should not be surprising that performance-based compensation can
give rise to a similar set of incentives for misconduct.114 From an
individual banker’s perspective, dispensing with ethical standards or
manipulating prices or markets can, in the short term, yield higher (group,
division, or institutional) profits that could result in higher compensation.
Meanwhile, as discussed above, if accountability structures are deficient,
the risk of detection may appear small. And where detection of misconduct
appears unlikely, the projected consequences of misconduct—professional
or legal—will likewise seem negligible. Overall, the result is that bankers
and traders may be prone to a risk-reward calculus that rationalizes
misconduct. Stated differently, insofar as deficient accountability and a
heavily performance-based compensation system are structural features of
the industry, they have the potential not only to incentivize individual
decisions to engage in misconduct, but also norms of misconduct in the
global financial services sector.
3. Networks
Together, as the foregoing discussion suggests, accountability
deficiencies and performance compensation structures can rationalize
misconduct for a profit-maximizing—even risk-averse—banker or trader in
a large financial institution. And to the extent accountability deficiencies
and performance-based compensation are structural features of the industry
as a whole, these incentive effects will arise simultaneously, affecting the
cultural fabric of the industry, not only an individual’s actions. Still, aside
from the structural reasons why certain cultural norms of misconduct
develop and stick, there is the additional question of how it is that these
norms of misconduct can spread among financial institutions. This
phenomenon of misconduct contagion may very well perpetuate through
networks in the banker labor market.
a. Institution Cycling
The banker labor market is highly fluid and transient. As Karen Ho
documents in her ethnography of Wall Street investment banks, bankers use
their “multiple connections,” “clout,” and “reputation” to move from one
bank to another.115 As one of Ho’s analyst-interviewees explained the
system: “It’s very easy, especially for a senior person, to move from
company A to company B.”116 And, after a time, “if they don’t like the
company they’re working for or they don’t see eye-to-eye on the strategy,
don’t like the individuals, they can probably move again.”117 It is also
relatively common for junior bankers to move from institution to institution
114. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Return of the Rogue, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 127, 157
(2009); Pay and Performance: Bonus Points, ECONOMIST, Apr. 15, 1995, at 71–72 (noting
compensation structures can create incentives for misconduct).
115. HO, supra note 111, at 267.
116. Id. at 268.
117. Id.
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—indeed, a junior-level transition is perhaps easier than transitioning is for
a senior banker, given that their labor is relatively cheaper and skill set
more malleable. Combined with low levels of institutional loyalty, the
turnover tradition in the industry creates a transient labor market.118
The industry’s compensation structure—oriented around performance
pay—is one possible reason for its fluidity.119 When a bank’s bonuses are
announced in December or January, news among the various banks travels
quickly.120 At that point, bankers begin to reassess their competitive
position and the desirability of their current employment.121 Simply, banks
that pay the highest bonuses become the most sought after employers. And
inasmuch as bankers seek higher bonus-paying banks, the banks also use
lower bonuses to signal to low-performing employees that they should
move elsewhere.122 In this environment, bankers will try to trade up, just as
banks are competing with one another for top labor in a highly competitive
labor market. One straightforward result of this compensation-driven
transience is that business practices or norms—including those involving
misconduct—will also, with the bankers themselves, cycle through the
various institutions.
b. Banker Networks
Relatedly, as bankers move between institutions, they grow their social
and professional networks. By virtue of changing jobs (and changing them
often), bankers have the ability to develop a wide, but close-knit,
professional network. These networks are then solidified through constant
and repeating interbank professional interactions. After all, much of the
business of large, complex banks today is comprised of transactions with
other banks. Whereas traditionally the bulk of banks’ interactions involved
simple lending and deposit-taking activities with consumers and companies,
today complex banks lend and borrow substantially with other banks.123
Bankers thus have substantial opportunity to build and maintain

118. MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE 64 (2010)
(quoting one bond trader shortly before the Crisis as saying “I don’t have any particular
allegiance to Deutsche Bank . . . . I just work there” and remarking that “[t]his was not an
unusual attitude”).
119. See HO, supra note 111, at 267 (discussing bonus chasing in the industry).
120. See, e.g., Martin Arnold, Bankers Fight Over Smaller Bonus Pool, FIN. TIMES, Jan.
12, 2015, at 17.
121. See Simone M. Sepe & Charles K. Whitehead, Paying for Risk: Bankers,
Compensation, and Competition 3–4 (Cornell L. Fac., Working Paper No. 114, 2012)
(arguing that given the “market’s demand for talent[,] . . . firms are expected to adjust
compensation in line with market demand, assessing and paying employees based on their
relative ability to generate returns”).
122. See HO, supra note 111, at 266–67.
123. See Judge, supra note 103, at 1264; see also Charles W. Calomiris, Blueprints for a
New Global Financial Architecture, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS: THE
CHALLENGE OF GLOBALIZATION 259, 270–72 (Leonardo Auernheimer ed., 2003).
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professional bonds with their counterparts, who “play similar roles in the
same network.”124
In many cases, these professional networks strengthen already existing
social networks. As explained, bankers and traders are a relatively
homogenous group. Many have similar elite educational (as well as
professional) backgrounds. They tend to share personal characteristics as
well, viewing themselves collectively as smart, aggressive, and
successful.125 Over time, repeatedly hiring similar people into financial
services jobs has a compounding effect—homophily; that is, similar people
tend to gravitate toward one another.126 As such, this “elite kinship creates
a bridge or network.”127 The effect is not only to connect bankers and
traders, but also to connect the banks for whom they work: “[I]ndividuals
connected to the same organization are, in a sense, connected to each other
through those organizations. In the same way, organizations are connected
to each other through the people they attract as members.”128 And these
networks can serve as conduits for influence and norm transmission.129
The impact of these networks may best be understood through a
sociological frame and social network theory in particular, which teaches
that people who are connected tend to influence one another’s behavior.130
Indeed, variants of social network theory have been instructive in the
corporate setting. Relying on data from a 1985 study of Minneapolis
CEOs, for example, Martin Kilduff and Wenpin Tsai hypothesized that the
social connections that CEOs formed through membership in the same
clubs and boards influenced their corporate decisions.131 In a similar vein,
Cesare Fracassi has found a causal relationship between social ties and
corporate finance decisions and thus argues that “companies are influenced
in their policy decision making process by their nearest social

124. MARTIN KILDUFF & WENPIN TSAI, SOCIAL NETWORKS AND ORGANIZATIONS 59
(2003); see also Daniel J. Brass et al., Relationships and Unethical Behavior: A Social
Network Perspective, 23 ACADEMY OF MGMT. REV. 14, 25 (1998) (noting that “individuals
compare themselves with, and adopt similar attitudes and the behavior of, those others who
occupy equivalent positions in the network”).
125. See HO, supra note 111, at 17; PARLIAMENTARY COMM’N ON BANKING STANDARDS,
CHANGING BANKING FOR GOOD: REPORT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION ON BANKING
STANDARDS (VOLUME II), 2013–14, HL 27-II, at 134 (UK), http://www.
parliament.uk/documents/banking-commission/Banking-final-report-vol-ii.pdf (recounting
an assessment given by the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development that the
banking industry created “a somewhat self-reinforcing, monolithic working culture . . . with
the same types of people recruited time and again”) [perma.cc/QU56-354C].
126. See KILDUFF & TSAI, supra note 124, at 50; Brass et al., supra note 124, at 18 (noting
that “[r]esearch has supported the general observation that similar people tend to interact and
that interaction leads to further similarity”).
127. HO, supra note 111, at 13; see CHARLES KADUSHIN, UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL
NETWORKS: THEORIES, CONCEPTS, AND FINDINGS 9 (2012).
128. KILDUFF & TSAI, supra note 126, at 21.
129. See Brass et al., supra note 124, at 15. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE
OBEY THE LAW (2006).
130. KADUSHIN, supra note 127, at 9.
131. KILDUFF & TSAI, supra note 126, at 21–23.
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neighbors.”132 And more recently, corporate law scholars have paid
significant attention to networks between interlocking boards of directors.
Michal Barzuza and Quinn Curtis found in their 2013 study that the
networks created between interlocking directors served to influence
corporate decisions about director indemnification.133 Surveying this body
of literature, John Bizjak and his coauthors concluded that “social
networks . . . play an important role in facilitating the exchange of
information between firms and in determining the types of practices
adopted across firms and industries.”134 Overall, this research on CEO and
board relationships, and the sociological theories on which it draws, gives
one reason to think that the professional and social networks among bankers
can serve as a conduit for interbank influence surrounding norms of
misconduct.135
In theory, then, banker networks may at least in part be responsible for
the spreading of misconduct norms: where profit- or reputational-driven
misconduct takes hold in one corner of an institution, it can spread readily
through these social and professional networks. This contagious spreading
can have a powerful normalizing effect, which can be seen in cases like
LIBOR, where the traders involved appeared to believe that what they were
doing was routine—not extraordinary or subversive.136 If so, the
phenomenon whereby wrongdoing in a society becomes ordinary may also
be at work in the global banking sector due in part to this networking effect.
As Saira Mohamed points out in the international criminal law context,
those who engage in reprehensible acts are often “regular people who
succumb to the pressure of situational coercion[,] . . . people who had no
prior intention to do anything wrong.”137
Evidence does in fact suggest that misconduct in the banking sector may
be situational, not a manifestation of a deep rotten character of the
individuals involved. In fact, one recent experiment on banking culture—
the first of its kind—found that when bankers’ professional identities were
primed, they were more likely to act dishonestly than when they were
132. Cesare Fracassi, Corporate Finance Policies and Social Networks, MGMT. SCI.
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 2, 24), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1121503 [perma.cc/5543928E].
133. See Michal Barzuza & Quinn Curtis, Interlocking Board Seats and Protection for
Directors After Schoon (Va. L. & Econ. Research Paper No. 2013-11, Oct. 1, 2013),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2282142 [perma.cc/57DT-Y8LW].
134. John Bizjak et al., Option Backdating and Board Interlocks, 22 REV. FIN. STUDS.
4821, 4826 (2009).
135. See Brass et al., supra note 124, at 17 (discussing the “assumption that
organizational actors are embedded within a network of relationships” and that “[t]hese
ongoing social relationships provide the constraints and opportunities that, in combination
with characteristics of individuals, issues, and organizations, may help explain unethical
behavior in organizations”).
136. Sung Hui Kim has suggested that the key to understanding “extraordinary behavior”
(i.e., misconduct) in a firm is to take account of what is perceived to be “ordinary behavior”
among its employees. Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside
Counsel As Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 997 (2005).
137. Saira Mohamed, Deviance, Aspiration, and the Stories We Tell: Reconciling Mass
Atrocity and the Criminal Law, 124 YALE L.J. 1628, 1648 (2015).
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not.138 Ultimately, this suggests that holistic, ex ante structural regulation
can be much more effective at reducing financial misconduct than ad hoc
and reactive enforcement, which views misconduct as an individualized,
even bad apples, type problem.
B. Structural Interventions
A structural diagnosis leads naturally to a structural prescription, which,
in contrast to traditional approaches to bank misconduct, can be forward
looking in design while forging key partnerships between regulators and
private market institutions.
1. Prophylactics
Structural solutions lend themselves to preventive or prophylactic
responses. Whereas regulatory policies focused entirely on changing
conduct through deterrence (i.e., conduct rules coupled with enforcement)
tend to be reactionary and ex post, structural solutions can be proactive and
ex ante. By identifying the structures that tend to give rise to or manifest in
misconduct, regulators can be forward looking in their approach—thinking
creatively about what can be done to diagnose and then forestall risks that
could contribute to the next crisis. Applied here, such a forward-looking
approach would involve tools that seek to modify gaps in accountability or
suboptimal compensation structures in ways that might successfully prevent
the incidence of misconduct in the first place. It would also entail a better
understanding of networks and their potential to spread business norms.
Ultimately, when dealing with potentially systemic risks, a prophylactic
approach is likely to be much less costly than sole reliance on ex post
consequences, which are of little utility in a crisis situation.139
In the universe of prophylactic options, focusing on structure appears at
least in theory to be a more efficient use of limited regulatory resources
than trying to change more amorphous problems like bank culture. Very
recently, as regulators have more seriously begun to appreciate the need for
holistic approaches to misconduct, the conversation about misconduct in
banks has become steeped in questions of culture.140 But having diagnosed
misconduct as a cultural problem, regulators are now hard-pressed to find
138. See Alain Cohn et al., Business Culture and Dishonesty in the Banking Industry, 516
NATURE 86 (2014).
139. Cf. Katharina Pistor, A Legal Theory of Finance, 41 J. COMP. ECON. 315, 328–29
(2013) (noting that one “major lesson” of her theory is the need for “safety valves,” else we
must “put our faith into central banks—their willingness and ability to do the right thing ex
post facto”).
140. See Stephen Dockery, Regulators’ Emphasis on ‘Culture’ Spurs Hunt to Measure It,
WALL STREET J. (Feb. 4, 2016), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2016/
02/04/regulators-emphasis-on-culture-spurs-hunt-to-measure-it/ [https://perma.cc/M4VWPCBM]; Alberto G. Musalem, Exec. V.P., Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Why Focus on
Culture (Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2015/mus
151123 (remarking that “[t]he New York Fed has, for the last two years, been part of an
international dialogue on the reform of culture in the financial services industry”)
[perma.cc/QY3K-HS38].
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satisfactory solutions within their existing toolkit.141 The Governor of the
Bank of England, Mark Carney, has disclaimed the ability of public
regulation to fix culture, stating that “[v]irtue cannot be regulated” and that
“[e]ven the strongest supervision cannot guarantee good conduct.”142
Likewise, Fed Chair Janet Yellen has conceded that “changing the culture
of organizations is not something that we can achieve through
supervision.”143
Because a cultural diagnosis surpasses regulators’ institutional capacity
for treatment, a cultural discourse implicitly puts the onus on banks to fix
their own behavior. While self-assessment and self-correction are no doubt
necessary, the problem with an emphasis on culture is that it may ultimately
take the problem almost entirely out of regulators’ hands. Bringing
structure to the fore, however, gives regulators an entry point for tackling
what may at root be a cultural problem, but nonetheless has concrete
drivers. In sum, a regulatory strategy that focuses on structural problems
and accompanying solutions has significant normative and practical appeal.
Structural weaknesses can be relatively well-defined and progress toward
reform observable even if not perfectly measurable at first. Such strategy
also lends itself to a complementarity approach, whereby regulators expend
their resources in areas in which they have a comparative advantage, while
leveraging the knowledge and resources of the private sector where their
capacities fall short.
2. Complementarity
Regulatory tools that engage the private market reflect what some
scholars have referred to as a “complementarity” approach, which neither
delegates regulatory authority (in a classic private ordering sense) nor relies
wholly on top-down approaches or “belt-and-suspenders style

141. William C. Dudley of the New York Federal Reserve recently described firm culture
in the following ambiguous terms: “Like a gentle breeze, culture may be hard to see, but
you can feel it.” William C. Dudley, Pres. & CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Enhancing
Financial Stability by Improving Culture in the Financial Services Industry (Oct. 20, 2014),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2014/dud141020a.html
[perma.cc/DX6X-FPVE]; see also Thomas C. Baxter, Exec. V.P. & Gen. Counsel, Fed.
Reserve Bank of N.Y., Compliance—Some Thoughts About Reaching the Next Level (Feb.
9, 2015) (expressing the importance of culture, but noting difficulties of measurement).
142. William D. Cohan, Can Bankers Behave?, ATLANTIC (May 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/05/can-bankers-behave/389558
[perma.cc/UH69-7GZ2].
143. John Heltman, Yellen: Fed Can’t Change Bank Culture Through Supervision, AM.
BANKER (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/law-regulation/yellen-fedcant-change-bank-culture-through-supervision-1073318-1.html [perma.cc/4J3G-X3SS]; see
also Gwendolyn Gordon & David Zaring, Ethical Bankers 24 (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author) (arguing that when regulators turn to ethical standards, it suggests a
“fascinating concession” that “sensible supervision alone is unlikely to realize the regulatory
mission of a relatively stable banking system”).
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duplication.”144 Regulators and the private market work in tandem, each
expending their resources according to their relative strengths.
In a similar but slightly more self-regulatory vein, other scholars, like
Cary Coglianese and David Lazer, have developed a regulatory theory of
“management-based regulation”145 (MBR). The general idea of MBR is
closely related to the notion of complementarity: regulators specify an
objective, but then allow firms to self-evaluate and develop a set of internal
rules that are consistent with achieving the regulator’s objectives.146 So, for
example, under an MBR model, the EPA requires regulated industries that
use certain chemicals “to develop risk management plans” for their use.147
And the FDA requires food processors “to use a flow chart to evaluate
production process[], identify possible sources of [pathogen] contamination,
and evaluate and implement alternatives for reducing contamination
risk.”148 In one analogous setting, legislation surrounding the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act mandates that firms implement control systems that
provide “reasonable assurances” that the use of corporate assets will not be
used for improper means in foreign business transactions.149 This approach
reflects the realization that “U.S. regulators lack[] the enforcement
resources to police business units in far-flung corners of a globalized
economy.”150
One can readily see how defining the problem as structural is conducive
to complementarity-style regulatory tools. Indeed, as in these other
contexts, if not more so, complementarity is ideally suited to the problems
presented by misconduct in complex financial institutions. For one,
regulators are often handicapped when it comes to assessing large banks’
vulnerabilities to misconduct.151 As the Crisis taught us, regulators
frequently lack the real-time information to anticipate the types of activity
that may lead to misconduct until significant damage is done.152 Similarly,
given the complexity of the industry, regulators tend to lag behind the
private sector in their expertise with new or emerging financial products
144. Judge, supra note 103, at 1295–96; see also Jonathan R. Macey, The Regulator
Effect in Financial Regulation, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 591 (2013) (discussing how regulators
incorporate and adapt market devices into regulatory tools).
145. See Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing
Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 L. & SOC’Y REV. 691 (2003).
146. See id. at 695 (developing a theory of “management-based regulation,” which
“place[s] responsibility for decisionmaking with those who possess the most information
about risks and potential control methods”).
147. Lori Snyder Bennear, Evaluating Management-Based Regulation: A Valuable Tool
in the Regulatory Tool Box?, in LEVERAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR: MANAGEMENT-BASED
STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE 51, 52 (Cary Coglianese &
Jennifer Nash eds., 2006).
148. Id.
149. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B) (2012).
150. Robert F. Weber, An Alternative Story to the Law and Regulation of Risk
Management, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1005, 1027 (2013).
151. Christina Parajon Skinner, Whistleblowing and Financial Innovation, 94 N.C. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 26–29) (on file with author).
152. See id. (arguing that informational asymmetries delay or impede regulatory
anticipation of misconduct).
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and strategies, making it difficult for them to anticipate where misconduct
might creep in.153 Finally, when it comes to devising solutions to
misconduct in banks, as outsiders, it is likely challenging for regulators to
accurately assess which types of internal firm structures, policies, or
systems would be more or less effective at reducing misconduct.
The relative strengths of the private market in all of these areas suggest
two things for regulatory design. First, the private market is in the better
position to know precisely how to address the industry’s structural
problems relating to accountability gaps and the ways in which
compensation may create perverse incentives. Second, attempting to devise
top-down rules for banks with respect to their conduct may, like so much
financial regulation, focus on past examples of misconduct, while failing to
anticipate future problems. Regulation by fiat thus runs the risk of being
misdirected or counterproductive. Arguably, then, the most productive use
of finite regulatory resources is for regulators to identify a general objective
and then to leverage the private sector’s insights and resources to develop
and implement the solution.
Complementarity approaches are not only desirable because they
efficiently allocate regulatory resources, but also because they tend to be
parsimonious in scope. Regulatory tools that work in concert with existing
private market efforts will naturally be less costly than either top-down
rules that aim to mandate or preclude certain conduct, or ex post
enforcement actions that seek to shape behavior through punishment and
deterrence. And managing the added costs of regulation is becoming
increasingly important in the post-Crisis regulatory order. Five years into
the new regime, various unintended consequences and negative side effects
of the ever-expanding regulatory framework are beginning to surface.154
As the regulatory ground continues to shift and the ultimate effects of this
new framework remain unknown, prudence counsels caution when
contemplating regulatory expansion.
In sum, a regulatory strategy that focuses on the various structural
aspects of the banking sector that incentivize and then spread misconduct
has normative appeal as a resource-wise prophylactic with potential to
reduce misconduct risk. The next part critiques the current regulatory
framework for missing this opportunity—by focusing on the quantitative
risks that banks pose and deploying an almost exclusively capital-oriented
arsenal of regulatory tools. It then suggests how this framework might be
revised to incorporate the use of innovative regulatory tools, which would
better reflect the theoretical insights offered in Parts I and II.
III. REBALANCING THE BASEL REGIME
Until this point, the goal of this Article has been to establish a framework
for regulators to understand how and under what circumstances misconduct
risk arises. This Article illustrated the potential for misconduct to generate
153. Id.
154. See infra Part III.C (discussing these externalities in greater detail).
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economic and social costs (and even contribute to systemic risk) in Part I
and theorized the structural roots of misconduct risk in Part II. The balance
of this Article addresses some remaining questions of regulatory and
institutional design. The principal goal of Part III is to critique the Basel
regime—which sets international standards for global banks—as
insufficiently addressed to the problem of misconduct risk.
To that end, Part III.A briefly describes the current Basel framework,
highlighting the problems with its predominantly quantitative approach to
managing risk in banks. Part III.B and III.C then offer a potential path
toward a more balanced Basel regime, that is, one that weighs quantitative
risks alongside the qualitative risks posed by misconduct in an effort to
reach a more efficient regulatory equilibrium. Part III.B suggests a new
supervisory tool that may be effective at reducing misconduct risk in global
banks—compliance stress testing—and Part III.C proposes a way to offset
capital ratios where such a supervisory tool is adopted. These suggestions
in Part III.B and III.C are necessarily preliminary in nature and mainly
intended not as a silver bullet, but to prompt conversation about the optimal
balance between the capital regulation and supervision of globally active
banks.
A. Regulating Capital
Basel III was the international regulatory community’s response to the
Crisis.155 It responded to concerns that the pre-Crisis capital regime had
been far too lax.156 Its heightened capital and liquidity requirements were
thus intended as a “comprehensive set of reform[s]” to “strengthen the
regulation, supervision and risk management of the banking sector.”157
1. Basel’s Pillars
Basel III uses capital and liquidity requirements both to incentivize more
prudent risk taking and to shore up a firm’s defenses (i.e., its cushion)
against potential future losses. In other words, the Basel regime relies on
quantitative restrictions both to reduce the likelihood of a shock in the first
155. In general, since the Crisis, international financial regulation has grown increasingly
more important. See Robert B. Thompson, Financial Regulation’s Architecture Within
International Economic Law, 17 J. INT’L ECON. L. 807, 808 (2014) (noting that “the postcrisis years have also witnessed the most intense efforts since Bretton Woods to construct a
new international economic order”); see also David Zaring, Sovereignty Mismatch and the
New Administrative Law, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 59 (2013).
156. Lax capital ratios were faulted as a significant cause of the Crisis. Basel’s rules at
the time did not strictly define capital, and banks were permitted to use forms of debt that
could not absorb losses in the way that equity could. Moreover, banks were permitted to use
their own internal models to calculate the riskiness of their assets. See Origins of the
Financial Crisis, ECONOMIST (Sept. 7, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/
21584534-effects-financial-crisis-are-still-being-felt-five-years-article
[perma.cc/ZE4XQJ48].
157. International Regulatory Framework for Banks (Basel III), BANK FOR INT’L
SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm?m=3%7C14%7C572 (last visited Feb.
26, 2016) [perma.cc/Q347-R3FH].
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instance, by attempting to reduce risk in the financial system, and to guard
against possible contagion, by ensuring that shocks can be contained. To
that end, although Basel III, like the Basel II regime before it, included
three pillars of reform—oriented around capital, supervision, and market
discipline—the “centerpiece” of this regime is the capital-focused Pillar
1.158
The Pillar 1 reforms imposed an across-the-board increase in the quality
and quantity of regulatory capital that banks are required to hold.
Previously under Basel II, banks were required to maintain 4 percent of
their risk-weighted assets in so-called Tier 1 capital (the safest and most
liquid forms of capital).159 Basel III now requires them to retain 6 percent
of that valuable Tier 1 capital—and of that, 4.5 percent in common
equity.160 Basel III introduced several new additional requirements, beyond
the standard minimum capital rules. For one, it added a countercyclical
capital buffer, which requires banks to increase their regulatory capital an
additional 2.5 percent during periods of strong economic growth.161
National authorities have additional discretion to require even more
conservation during such periods of credit growth.162 It also added a 2.5
percent conservation buffer that can be drawn down in times of stress.163
And as an additional measure for the largest global banks, Basel III
developed a capital surcharge for “too big to fail” institutions.164 The
consequence of breaching capital requirements is, among other things,
regulatory restrictions on an institution’s ability to pay dividends and
repurchase shares.165
Basel III also added three “backstop” measures to complement the riskbased capital requirements.166 One is a new leverage ratio (also subsumed
158. Romano, supra note 15, at 24 (referring to the Basel II regime).
159. See Federal Reserve Board, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Calculation of Tier 1
Capital and Total Qualifying Capital (Sept. 25, 2006) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 208,
225, 325, 566), http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/basel2/npr_20060905/npr/
section_4.htm [perma.cc/CM86-BXRS].
160. BASEL III, supra note 6, at 64. Basel III also reconfigured the way in which riskweights are calculated for many types of tradable assets. For a graphical summary for Basel
III reforms, see BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION REFORMS, BASEL III,
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3/b3summarytable.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2016)
[perma.cc/Z3AZ-AQSW].
161. BASEL III, supra note 6, at 57–59.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 54–57.
164. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, THE G-SIB ASSESSMENT
METHODOLOGY—SCORE CALCULATION (2014), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d296.pdf
[perma.cc/F4EZ-G3EP]; see also Press Release, Fed. Reserve (July 20, 2015),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20150720a.htm (detailing the Fed’s
final rule regarding the GSIB surcharge) [perma.cc/V5M6-F3G8].
165. See BEVERLY HIRTLE & ANDREAS LEHNERT, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF
REPORT NO. 696, SUPERVISORY STRESS TESTS 18 (2014); see also Julie Andersen Hill, Bank
Capital Regulation by Enforcement: An Empirical Study, 87 IND. L.J. 645 (2012)
(discussing post-Crisis capital regulation and enforcement in the United States).
166. The Financial Stability Board (FSB) has also focused on ways to use capital
requirements to manage the “too big to fail” risk. The FSB, which acts as the regulatory arm
of the G20’s most powerful economies, has recently established a Total Loss Absorbency
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under Pillar 1), which is set at three percent of capital to total assets.167 The
second two reforms, ancillary but outside of Pillar 1, deal with liquidity.
Pursuant to a “Liquidity Coverage Ratio,” banks must now maintain enough
liquid assets to withstand a thirty-day funding freeze.168 And a “net stable
funding ratio” further requires banks to maintain adequate levels of longterm sources of funding, such as long-term debt and deposits, to counteract
their pre-Crisis tendency to over-rely on short-term sources of wholesale
Though
funding, such as repurchase agreements or “repos.”169
implementation is not yet complete (with a timetable running through
2019), so far, regulators both in the United States and abroad have begun to
implement Basel III’s various requirements.170
Pillars 2 and 3, on supervision and market discipline respectively, should
in theory address issues surrounding misconduct, but are actually quite
weak on those scores. Even the most recent Pillar 2 and 3 reforms only
obliquely deal with misconduct.
Pillar 3 added new disclosure
requirements to improve market discipline, which were finalized in January
2015.171 These requirements purport to “enable market participants to
access key information relating to a bank’s regulatory capital and risk
Capacity (TLAC) capital requirement for the largest global banks. TLAC requires G-SIBs to
increase their regulatory capital and long-term unsecured debt to at least 16 percent of their
risk-weighted assets by January 2019 and 18 percent by January 2022. Press Release, Fin.
Stability Bd., FSB Issues Final Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity Standard for Global
Systemically Important Banks (Nov. 9, 2015), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/
20151106-TLAC-Press-Release.pdf [perma.cc/Y3BC-2L44].
167. BASEL III, supra note 6, at 61–63; see also BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION,
BASEL III LEVERAGE RATIO FRAMEWORK AND DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS (2014),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs270.pdf (setting out updated requirements of the leverage ratio
framework) [perma.cc/4UEH-WYGR].
168. BASEL III, supra note 6, at 9 (noting that the purpose of the LCR is to “help ensure
that global banks have sufficient unencumbered, high-quality liquid assets to offset the net
cash outflows it could encounter under an acute short-term stress scenario”); BASEL COMM.
ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: THE LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO AND LIQUIDITY RISK
MONITORING TOOLS ¶ 1 (2013), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.pdf [perma.cc/MX2SVWEA].
169. BASEL III, supra note 6, at 9.
170. See 78 Fed. Reg. 62,018, 62,030–38 (Oct. 11, 2013) (requiring, among other things,
that all banking organizations comply with Basel III’s 4.5 percent capital to risk-weighted
assets ratio and Basel III’s leverage ratio (for advanced approaches banking institutions),
maintain a capital conservation buffer of 2.5 percent of additional common equity Tier 1
capital over regulatory minimums, and adopt a countercyclical conservation buffer of up to
2.5 percent). The EU is also working toward implementing Basel III’s capital requirements
through a newly created framework that took effect in January 2014. Basel III was
implemented in Europe via the Fourth Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV) and the
Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) in EU Member States implementing Basel III.
BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, ASSESSMENT OF BASEL III REGULATIONS—
EUROPEAN UNION 8 (2014), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d300.pdf [perma.cc/SRQ3GZHP].
171. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, REVISED PILLAR 3 DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS (2015) [hereinafter BASEL III DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS], http://www.bis.
org/bcbs/publ/d309.pdf [perma.cc/LC5M-6JKN]; see Luigi L. De Ghenghi, Overview of
Basel Committee’s Revised Pillar 3 Disclosures, DAVIS POLK CAPITAL & PRUDENTIAL
STANDARDS BLOG (Jan. 30, 2015), http://blog.usbasel3.com/overview-of-basel-committeesrevised-pillar-3-disclosures-2 [perma.cc/65UM-EM54].
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exposures in order to increase transparency and confidence about a bank’s
exposure to risk.”172 But these revised Pillar 3 disclosure requirements do
not specifically mention misconduct as a distinct type of risk to be
disclosed.173
Pillar 2, on supervision, does speak to corporate governance more
generally and envisions a role for supervisors in “foster[ing] good corporate
governance in banks.”174 Still, the July 2015 revisions to these Pillar 2
principles provide little guidance on how supervisors can regulate
misconduct as a risk. They provide barely a page on compliance and a few
pages suggesting how supervisors should oversee boards and senior
management.175 Ultimately, as a document that provides “guidance,” these
Pillar 2 principles are likely to remain in Pillar 1’s shadow, with relatively
less attention and commitment from national regulators than Pillar 1’s
capital rules have garnered.
2. Operational Risk
At best, Basel addresses misconduct in its framework for operational
risk—which is defined as “the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or
failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events.”176
Though the interpretation of that definition varies, the Basel Committee
appears to have intended it to refer to a wide range of unanticipated and
exogenous risks to the business.177 Core examples of operational risk
include external fraud (like hacking), workplace safety or hardware failures,
or data entry errors.178 As far as employee misbehavior is concerned,
operational risk includes the possibility of bank losses that arise from rogue
or aberrational behavior, like employee theft or presumably other kinds of
ultra vires activity.179 Pursuant to Basel II operational risk requirements
(left intact and unmodified by Basel III), banks are responsible for
calculating this component of risk, using a combination of historical data
and information about the bank’s business environment and its internal

172. BASEL III DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS, supra note 171, at 1.
173. Interestingly, an earlier consultative document had, in fact, mentioned fraud as a
potential miscellaneous form of “other risk” for management to assess and disclose. But it
was noted to be beyond the scope of the consultative document. See BASEL COMM. ON
BANKING SUPERVISION, REVIEW OF THE PILLAR 3 DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 81 (2014),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs286.pdf [perma.cc/HTZ8-RAUS].
174. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES FOR
BANKS 38 (2015), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d328.pdf [perma.cc/ZR7U-EMYJ].
175. See id. at 31, 38–40.
176. BASEL. COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF
CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK ¶ 644 (2004),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.pdf [perma.cc/MX9R-TDAR].
177. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, SOUND PRACTICES FOR THE MANAGEMENT
AND SUPERVISION OF OPERATIONAL RISK 1–2 (2003), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs96.pdf
[perma.cc/CJE4-PS9X].
178. Id. at 2.
179. Id. Basel refers to this as internal fraud, such as “intentional misreporting of
positions, employee theft, and insider trading on an employee’s own account.” Id.
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control systems.180 Banks are then assessed an additional capital surcharge
based on that estimate.181
As a tool for treating misconduct risk, however, operational risk is wide
of the mark. To begin, operational risk is a crude (indeed inaccurate) proxy
for genuine misconduct risk, as the two are qualitatively quite different.
Whereas operational risk is concerned with the possibility of financial loss
to the institution, misconduct risk addresses potential economic harm to the
system (like bubbles and crises, distorted markets, and decreased consumer
and interbank lending). Because their focal points are very different—
operational risk on the firm and misconduct risk on the market—the two
risk categories overlap only slightly—and in many cases, not at all.182 As a
result, operational risk does not focus banks or regulators on the varied
types of misconduct that can have market-distorting potential and certainly
not on the industry-wide structural drivers of misconduct. Consequently,
this Basel risk category captures at best only a fraction of the type of
socially suboptimal behavior that can give rise to misconduct risk. It is,
overall, an antiquated view of misconduct that has not been updated to
reflect the post-Crisis macroprudential approach.
The distinction is deeper than definitional. Even if Basel were to expand
its conception of operational risk to include these various aspects of
misconduct risk, fundamental problems would still remain. For one, as
currently understood, operational risk assumes that banks can accurately
identify and estimate, based on historical incidents, the likelihood that
misconduct will expose them to future loss. But such a premise ignores the
evolving and complex nature of misconduct and the resulting reality that
past incidents will not accurately predict current vulnerabilities. Moreover,
even if firms did correctly estimate their internal vulnerability to
misconduct, human behavior (overconfidence and hubris) suggests that they
are likely to improperly revise downward that estimate. Under the existing
“advanced approaches” regime, large banks are not only permitted to
calculate their own operational risk based on historical incidents, they are
then entitled to adjust the final calculation based on a self-assessment of the
effectiveness of their internal controls.183 This discretion and subjectivity
180. See, e.g., BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, OPERATIONAL RISK—
SUPERVISORY GUIDELINES FOR THE ADVANCED MEASUREMENT APPROACHES (2011),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs196.pdf [perma.cc/FAQ4-KJYH].
181. See Maike Sundmacher, Operational Risk Capital Charges for Banks:
Consideration
and
Consequences,
(May
2004)
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=963227 [perma.cc/VG8L-LADT].
182. For example, operational risk would likely not capture any unethical distortion of
information that took place in global banks in the years preceding the Crisis, even though
that conduct may have had a macroeconomically destabilizing effect (as well as legal and
reputational costs to the firm).
183. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 180, at 51. But see JOINT
COMM. EUR. SUPERVISORY AUTHS., JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT ON RISKS AND
VULNERABILITIES IN THE EU FINANCIAL SYSTEM 13 (2015), https://www.eba.europa.eu/
documents/10180/950548/JC+2015+007+JC+Report+on+Risks+and+Vulnerabilities+in+the
+EU+Financial+System.pdf (recommending supervisory benchmarks for conduct risk within
the operational risk framework) [perma.cc/T8DB-Q457]. Moreover, using historical losses
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thus enables banks to overestimate the efficacy of their internal control
systems, while underestimating the risk of misconduct-related loss, arriving
at risk estimates in various and unpredictable ways.
Ultimately, the inadequacy of operational risk goes to the root of the
Basel critique. Operational risk reflects Basel’s bedrock assumption about
managing risk in banks: that risk can be controlled, or at least reduced, by
imposing higher capital adequacy requirements. But there are limits to
what capital can accomplish as a regulatory tool. The diagnosis of
misconduct as a market-wide risk implicates a complicated interaction
between accountability, compensation, and networks in banks that can, in
combination, give rise to norms of misconduct that spread broadly. While
increasing capital ratios might marginally increase institutional incentives
to improve internal control systems, it seems quite unlikely to effect a
meaningful revision of individual and group incentives on the ground—at
the deal team and trading floor levels.
Overall, Basel’s emphasis on quantitative, measureable risk has resulted
in a failure of imagination about how to regulate misconduct risk.184 The
Basel regime has focused regulators and academics on quantifiable—known
and observable—risks. It has largely disregarded the structural drivers and
contagions of misconduct and, consequently, failed to broker international
regulatory cooperation to combat its industry-wide spread.185 The
remainder of this Article suggests one possible way of incorporating
misconduct risk more prominently into the Basel regime, while mindful of
institutions’ overall regulatory burden.
B. Regulating Conduct
Thus far, this Article has urged that misconduct is an underappreciated
source of market-wide risk. This section now suggests a way to introduce
misconduct as a risk priority in the Basel III regime. To that end, this
section argues that Basel III should adopt new supervisory requirements
aimed at misconduct risk. What follows is a preliminary design proposal
for such a supervisory tool.

to calculate operational risk is inherently backward looking. See Mehrsa Baradaran,
Regulation by Hypothetical, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1247, 1279 (2014) (noting that banks’
internal risk assessment has historically failed to account for “black swan”—i.e., low
probability, high magnitude—events); Krawiec, supra note 114, at 130 (noting that “[t]he
nature and scarcity of some types of operational loss events, combined with the relatively
preliminary state of operational risk modeling, means that the enforcement arm of this
particular enforced self-regulatory regime is apt to be lacking”).
184. Some scholars have argued that the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States, which was
also aimed at curtailing systemic risk, had too little to say on misconduct and, specifically,
the board’s oversight of financial firms’ compliance function. See Johnson, supra note 11.
185. See Romano, supra note 15, at 25 (observing that Basel is not focused on unknown
or unknowable risk).
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1. Bank Compliance
A preliminary question is whether regulatory intervention to manage
misconduct risk is necessary in light of existing private market efforts. To
be sure, global banks have made considerable effort in recent years to
expand their compliance departments.186 Generally speaking, a bank’s
compliance function serves two main purposes. First, compliance is
supposed to ensure that bankers adhere to laws and regulation. As the
Basel Committee describes it, compliance is “[a]n independent function that
identifies, assesses, advises on, monitors and reports on” the range of risks
associated with failure to comply with “applicable laws, regulations, codes
of conduct and standards of good practice.”187 Its second purpose is to
propagate ethical norms throughout the firm.188
Perhaps not surprisingly, in the wake of recent misconduct scandals,
banks’ compliance departments have exploded.189
So quickly has
compliance ramped in the past few years that the Wall Street Journal has
referred to it as one of the “hotter” careers in America today.190 J.P.
Morgan and HSBC—the two largest G-SIBS—have alone made enormous
expenditures. J.P. Morgan employed more than 8000 employees for antimoney laundering compliance alone in 2014 (and planned to add 13,000 for
compliance overall),191 and in 2013, HSBC added 1600 new compliance
employees.192 Aside from expanding manpower, banks have also begun to
experiment with new ideas for making compliance effective. Barclays, for
example, created a compliance “academy” in partnership with a U.K.
business school.193 And recent industry surveys confirm that many
institutions have restructured their compliance departments so that the chief

186. In the United States, the Dodd-Frank Act requires large financial institutions to have
a compliance framework. Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain
Interests in, Relationship with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 12 C.F.R. § 248,
subpart D (2014).
187. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, THE COMPLIANCE FUNCTION IN BANKS 3
(2003) (emphasis omitted), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs103.pdf [perma.cc/ARQ7-7F78].
188. Baer, supra note 11, at 959. Compliance can be thought of as a subset of enterprise
risk management, which is more generally concerned with the firm’s mechanisms for
“agency cost control,” among other risks to the business. See Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. CORP. LAW. 967, 981 (2009).
189. Much of this compliance initiative has been driven by requirements in deferred
prosecution agreements and nonprosecution agreements, which condition forbearance on
compliance reform. See Griffith, supra note 11.
190. Gregory J. Millman & Samuel Rubenfeld, Compliance Officer: Dream Career?,
WALL STREET J. (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303330
204579250722114538750 [perma.cc/3E4S-3XL2].
191. Rachel Louise Ensign, Lenders Bolster Risk and Compliance Staff, WALL STREET J.
(May 4, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304163604579531263107
487566 [perma.cc/PG32-KUSS].
192. Millman & Rubenfeld, supra note 190.
193. Barclays Sets Up Elite Compliance Academy, FIN. TIMES: FASTFT (July 3, 2014),
http://www.ft.com/fastft/2014/07/03/post-176152/ [perma.cc/UA3Y-K5TH].
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compliance officer (CCO) reports directly to the board of directors (rather
than to a chief legal officer or the management team).194
However, there are both empirical and theoretical reasons that suggest
banks do (and will) underinvest in compliance. First, as an empirical
matter, the timeline of events since the Crisis supports that supposition.
Even after regulators disciplined banks for their behavior in the Crisis—
through investigations (which impose costs irrespective of the conclusion
on wrongdoing), historically large civil fines, criminal prosecutions, and
deferred prosecution agreements—misconduct in banks continued. As
earlier discussed, banks continued to manipulate LIBOR and other
benchmarks through 2012.195
Then, even after regulators detected banks’ LIBOR misconduct, they
discovered that banks were manipulating the forex markets. Indeed, as the
Economist aptly noted, the timing of “the currency-market
skullduggery . . . suggests banks were slow to clean up the rotten culture on
their trading floors, or that they genuinely thought their colluding ways had
been officially endorsed.”196 More recently, incidents involving known or
alleged international money laundering,197 tax evasion,198 corruption,199
194. A 2015 survey by Deloitte found that of its 364 respondent institutions, 57 percent
report that their CCO reports directly to either the CEO or the board (reflecting an upward
trend from previous years), and 55 percent regularly brief the board on ethics and culture.
DELOITTE, COMPLIANCE WEEK: IN FOCUS: 2015 COMPLIANCE TRENDS SURVEY 5 (2015),
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/regulatory/us-aers-reg-crs2015-compliance-trends-survey-051515.pdf [perma.cc/J3CP-DK5Q]. A 2014 Accenture
survey found that nearly one-third of their respondents had compliance reporting to the
board and 40 percent to the CEO. Compliance’s Seat at the Table—Hard to Earn, Hard to
Retain,
ACCENTURE
CONSULTING,
https://www.accenture.com/us-en/insight-2014compliance-risk-study-banking-summary (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) [perma.cc/2PHDATFV].
195. Notably, at least three of the global banks that received federal bailouts were also
involved or alleged to be involved in the LIBOR scandal. See Bailed Out Banks,
CNNMONEY, http://money.cnn.com/news/specials/storysupplement/bankbailout (last visited
Feb. 26, 2016) [perma.cc/8E2J-ABYJ]; Trefis Team, FDIC Sues 16 Global Banks for Roles
in Manipulating LIBOR, FORBES (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
greatspeculations/2014/03/18/fdic-sues-16-global-banks-for-roles-in-manipulating-libor
[perma.cc/XUK8-Y3VJ].
196. Bank, Fix Thyself, ECONOMIST (Mar. 8, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/
finance-and-economics/21598678-bank-england-faces-questions-over-its-role-rigged-forexdeals-bank-fix?fsrc=rss|fec [perma.cc/94GF-M6E7].
197. See, e.g., Rachel Louise Ensign & Max Colchester, HSBC Struggles in Battle
Against Money Laundering, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/hsbc-struggles-in-battle-against-money-laundering-1421100133
[perma.cc/Q93SCS5B]; HSBC Exposed U.S. Financial System to Money Laundering, Drug, Terrorist
Financing Risks, HOMELAND SECURITY & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS: PERM. SUBCOMM. ON
INVESTIGATIONS (July 16, 2012), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/
media/hsbc-exposed-us-finacial-system-to-money-laundering-drug-terrorist-financing-risks
[perma.cc/A7LB-KLR3]; Samuel Rubenfeld, U.S. Seeks to Compensate Victims of BNP
Paribas Violations, WALL STREET J. (May 1, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/
2015/05/01/u-s-seeks-to-compensate-victims-of-bnp-paribas-violations
[perma.cc/R76P9T6X].
198. See, e.g., John Letzing, HSBC Hit by Fresh Details of Tax Evasion Claims, WALL
STREET J. (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/hsbc-hit-by-fresh-details-of-taxevasion-claims-1423482612 [perma.cc/7RHQ-9MYW].
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and the manipulation of the swaps market200 have also come to light. And
although these later incidents of misconduct did not give rise to systemic
consequences, per se, they nonetheless circumstantially suggest that banks
may lack sufficient incentives to invest adequate resources in
compliance.201
From a strategy perspective, there is also some reason to think that
banks’ compliance efforts are still too uncreative.202 For example, a 2015
Deloitte survey of 364 global firms found that the three most common
responsibilities of a CCO are compliance training, code of conduct, and the
whistleblower hotline.203 These tasks, while important, are all inward
looking and surface level. None of these goals proactively targets the
potential ways in which misconduct can spread. Basic compliance, it
seems, ignores the larger question of how misconduct can be transmitted in
and out of a bank. Without digging deeper, standard compliance programs
such as these will not become agile enough to address the reasons why
incentive structures, accountability systems, labor markets, or interbank
networks perpetuate misconduct risk throughout the banking sector.
Moreover, from a theoretical standpoint, regulators should worry that
banks’ efforts, no matter how seemingly robust, will be insufficient from a
social welfare perspective. As Steven Schwarcz explains, regulatory
intervention is almost always appropriate where systemic risks are
concerned because “banks . . . will protect themselves but not the stability
of the banking system.”204 With misconduct also, the social costs of a
market failure to rein in misconduct risk—including contraction of liquidity
in the interbank market, contract and asset-price distortion, and possibly
even asset bubbles205—extend beyond the costs experienced by individual
financial institutions.
The problem can be framed in terms of cost internalization: a
misbehaving bank bears only a fraction of the resulting costs. To the extent
the misconduct is profitable, bankers/traders can benefit from misconduct in
the short and medium term, but bear only a fraction (if any) of the longerterm costs; those are imposed on other firms, the industry, and the economy
199. See, e.g., Chris Cumming, FIFA Scandal Will Test Banks’ Anti-Money-Laundering
Liability, AM. BANKER (May 28, 2015), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/nationalregional/fifa-scandal-will-test-banks-anti-money-laundering-liability-1074580-1.html
[perma.cc/S5Q7-4SL9].
200. See, e.g., Katy Burne, Big Banks Agree to Settle Swaps Lawsuit, WALL STREET J.
(Sept. 12, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/banks-wall-street-groups-agree-to-settlecredit-swaps-antitrust-case-1441988741 [perma.cc/NNV9-4NE8].
201. See Baer, supra note 11, at 952 (noting that today “corporations are no more
transparent or ethical than their predecessors”). Moreover, even if enforcement authorities in
the United States and Europe may be highly focused on compliance today, once the agreedto compliance reforms are made, enforcement’s focus will naturally move elsewhere. See
Griffith, supra note 11 (describing the increase in compliance mandated in nonprosecution
and deferred prosecution agreements).
202. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated
Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 487, 491 (2003).
203. DELOITTE, supra note 194, at 5.
204. Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 206.
205. See supra Part I (discussing macroeconomic costs associated with misconduct).
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more broadly. Thus typical, rational bank managers may choose to
underinvest in measures to reduce misconduct among their employees.206
On that rationale, it may be both socially desirable and economically
productive for regulators to intervene in the private market to ensure that
banks spend a sufficient amount of their limited strategic and financial
resources on compliance.207
2. Supervising Compliance
The preceding sections provided a descriptive and theoretical account of
why regulatory intervention in banking conduct is desirable. This section
offers a preliminary policy proposal as to how bank regulators might do so
within the Basel III framework. Specifically, Basel III’s Pillar 2
admonishes national supervisors to have an “effective system of banking
supervision.”208 The following proposal joins two supervisory tools that
Pillar 2 endorses—compliance programs and stress testing—to suggest how
supervision might be more effectively used to address misconduct risk in
the global banking sector: through compliance stress testing.
Stress testing is a well-established supervisory tool. It essentially
involves a review of how well a bank can withstand a hypothetical scenario
of stress; and that assessment is generally oriented around capital—what a
bank’s balance sheet looks like after experiencing a test shock. After the
Crisis, many national regulators required global banks to conduct companyrun stress tests, the results of which are used to inform bank supervision.209
Basel’s Pillar 2 in fact provided guidance on how national regulators should
supervise these internal stress tests (as written in the Basel II regime).210
In addition to institution-run stress tests, bank regulators also began to
stress test banks a few years after the Crisis. Now, many national regulators
conduct supervisory stress testing that is not necessarily required by Basel
III.211 In the United States, the Fed conducts a supervisory stress test,
formally called the “Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review”
206. See Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 206 (referring to a tragedy of the commons type
situation with respect to banks’ incentive to minimize systemic risk).
207. Ongoing supervision on the federal level is an important, arguably necessary
supplement to duties imposed by state corporate law. See In re Caremark Intern. Inc. Deriv.
Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 961–62, 969 (Del Ch. 1996).
208. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING
SUPERVISION 10 (2011), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs213.pdf [perma.cc/T4FJ-6YF2].
209. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND STRESS
TESTING PRACTICES AND SUPERVISION (2009), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs155.pdf
(providing guidance for banks’ stress testing practices) [perma.cc/XR5D-H74T]; see also
Baradaran, supra note 183, at 128–88 (providing a history of stress testing); Dodd-Frank Act
Stress Test (Company-Run), OFF. COMPTROLLER CURRENCY, http://www.occ.gov/toolsforms/forms/bank-operations/stress-test-reporting.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2016)
[perma.cc/6WWU-S8BG].
210. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 209, at 18.
211. In the United States, the first stress test (the Supervisory Capital Assessment
Program) was conducted on nineteen U.S.-owned bank holding companies in 2009. HIRTLE
& LEHNERT, supra note 165, at 9. Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR),
now an annual exercise, began in 2011. Id. at 16. The 2014 CCAR tested thirty bank
holding companies with assets of at least $50 billion. Id.
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(CCAR), on large American bank holding companies and foreign bank
subsidiaries.212 The European Banking Authority (EBA) also conducts
stress tests biannually, with a transparency exercise performed in off
years.213 And the Bank of England also conducts a stress test to assess the
system-wide health of the U.K. financial sector.214 For these central bank
regulators, the purpose of the supervisory stress test is to produce a
“quantitative view” of a bank under a hypothetical scenario of “adverse
external events, such as changes in real estate or capital markets prices, or
unanticipated deterioration in a borrower’s repayment capacity.”215
These annual or biannual tests involve banks’ submission of a “capital
plan” to their supervisors, which includes information about the bank’s
governance over those plans.216 With that information, supervisors then
model projected bank losses and incomes in the event of the hypothetical
scenario of stress.217 Stress testing thus serves as a forward-looking,
prophylactic tool; it is a “diagnostic” that is used to “drive the design of
future regulation.”218

212. This Article limits its discussion of U.S. stress testing to the CCAR. The Fed is also
responsible for administering the Dodd-Frank Act stress tests (DFAST). Id. at 12–16.
DFAST has only a quantitative component. Id.
213. Letter from Andrea Enria, Chairperson, Eur. Banking Auth., to Martin Schulz, Pres.,
Eur. Parliament, Decision by the EBA Board of Supervisors Regarding an EU-Wide Stress
Test in 2015 (Mar. 2, 2015), https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/999733/
EBA+letter+to+EP++EC++and+Council+-+Decision+EU-wide+stress+test+2015.pdf
[perma.cc/KX9A-MG6Q].
214. See BANK OF ENG., STRESS TESTING THE UK BANKING SYSTEM: 2015 RESULTS 5
(2015), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/Documents/fpc/results011215.pdf
(noting that the 2015 stress scenario “represents a coherent tail-risk scenario designed
specifically to assess the resilience of UK banks” and in particular to assess their capital
adequacy in light of the hypothetical adverse shock) [perma.cc/Q5RJ-4B4Y]; see also Oliver
Burrows et al., RAMSI: A Top-Down Stress Testing Model Developed at the Bank of
England, 52 Q. BULL. 204, 204–05 (2012).
215. ROBERT LONG, SR. EXAMINATION SPECIALIST, FDIC, STRESS TESTING AND MODEL
GOVERNANCE 5 (2013) (on file with author); see HIRTLE & LEHNERT, supra note 165, at 2;
see also Baradaran, supra note 183, at 1283–88 (explaining how stress tests in the United
States work).
216. HIRTLE & LEHNERT, supra note 165, at 16. Capital plans generally include
a detailed description of the firm’s internal capital planning process and
governance over that process; its capital policy governing capital actions such as
dividends, repurchases, and share issuance; its planned capital actions for the next
nine quarters under both baseline and stressed economic conditions; and a set of
company-run stress test projections under three scenarios provided by the Federal
Reserve . . . and under two bank-determined scenarios, including a baseline and
“BHC stress” scenario intended to stress the firm’s unique vulnerabilities based on
its portfolio and business focus.
Id. at 16–17.
217. See Baradaran, supra note 183, at 1287.
218. Id. at 1286; see BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., DODD-FRANK ACT
STRESS TEST 2013: SUPERVISORY STRESS TEST METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 3 (2013),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/dfast_2013_results_20130314.pdf
[perma.cc/6GX3-QC8B].
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The Fed’s CCAR also includes a qualitative component.219 Unlike the
quantitative component that involves a hypothetical scenario with
objectively measurable results, the qualitative component appears to
involve more evaluation than simulation.220 In general, it is focused on
how well a bank’s “capital planning process appropriately captures the
specific risks and vulnerabilities faced by the firm under stress.”221 In
2015, the Fed was especially focused on the comprehensiveness of a bank’s
“process for identifying the full range of relevant risks arising from its
exposures and business mix.”222 The qualitative component also considers
how well banks implement internal stress testing models, based on their
own “unique vulnerabilities arising from their particular business
strategies.”223 But the qualitative aspect of the CCAR stress tests has not,
to date, been highly focused on banks’ processes for assessing and
managing misconduct risk through their compliance infrastructure.
Expanding qualitative stress testing in this direction could, however,
provide bank supervisors with an ongoing institutional framework for
evaluating banks’ resilience against misconduct risk.
In particular, qualitative stress testing could be used to test the strength of
banks’ compliance functions, as a proxy for assessing a bank’s
susceptibility to misconduct risk—that is, by testing the likelihood that
misconduct will originate from or be imported to that bank. While there are

219. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL
ANALYSIS AND REVIEW 2016: SUMMARY INSTRUCTIONS 15–16 (2016).
220. HIRTLE & LENHERT, supra note 165, at 17 (noting that the “qualitative component
involves assessments of the firms’ internal processes for determining how much capital they
need to have”). As one commentator sarcastically remarked, failing the Fed’s stress tests for
qualitative reasons is “when the Fed rejects your capital plan not because it leaves you with
too little capital, but because it thinks you’re generally inept at capital planning, or doesn’t
like the smug look on your face during this stress test.” Matt Levine, Goldman Sachs Is
Cutting It Close on the Stress Test, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Mar. 11, 2015),
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-03-11/goldman-sachs-is-cutting-it-close-onthe-stress-test [perma.cc/TKJ4-XMAL].
221. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL ANALYSIS
AND REVIEW 2015: ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK AND RESULTS 7 (2015) [hereinafter 2015
CCAR RESULTS], http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20150311a1
.pdf [perma.cc/HH6G-TDYY]; see BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS.,
COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL ANALYSIS AND REVIEW 2014: SUMMARY INSTRUCTIONS AND
GUIDANCE
24–25
(2013),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/
bcreg20131101a2.pdf [perma.cc/RLD4-8JD5]; Peter Eavis, U.S. Banks Pass Stress Tests,
Some with an Asterisk, N.Y. TIMES: DEALB%K (Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/03/12/business/dealbook/us-banks-pass-stress-tests-but-not-without-somecheckmarks.html?_r=0 (reporting that Deutsche Bank and Santander failed for qualitative
reasons in 2015 “because of broad and deep deficiencies in how they planned for adverse
market conditions and an economic downturn”) [perma.cc/MW9E-WRGT]. As Governor
Tarullo has explained, the qualitative assessment of CCAR includes “the extent to which the
design of a firm’s internal scenario captures the specific risks from the firm’s activities, the
firm’s methods for projecting losses under stress scenarios, and how the firm identifies
appropriate capital levels and plans for distributions.” Gov. Daniel K. Tarullo, Stress Testing
After Five Years (June 25, 2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
tarullo20140625a.htm#f12 [perma.cc/CN4T-ZS4E].
222. 2015 CCAR RESULTS, supra note 221, at 8.
223. HIRTLE & LENHERT, supra note 165, at 17.
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likely many different ways that regulators could design such a qualitative
stress test, as a start, regulators could follow their current methodology for
conducting quantitative stress tests—scenario or simulation exercises.
Regulators could, for example, attempt to design a misconduct simulation
(i.e., a hypothetical scenario) to which banks would have to respond with
detailed action plans mapping out the policies in place to hold managing
directors accountable, stymie the unsocial use of banker networks that may
have contributed to the incident, and address compensation incentives that
may have played a role.
Relatedly, as part of a misconduct simulation, regulators could require
bank managers to conduct a misconduct premortem.224 Such an exercise
would be the “hypothetical opposite of a postmortem.”225 Together with
compliance, bank management would “brainstorm” every conceivable area
in which the institution is vulnerable to misconduct—thinking about the
possibility of misconduct in, for example, high profit-generating groups,
teams with highly concentrated or individual discretion, and groups that
structure or trade bespoke and especially niche or complex products.
Lastly, to supplement the information gathered from the scenario-based
exercise, banks should also provide regulators with a general “compliance
plan” in conjunction with their capital plans.226
Compliance stress testing would be an experimental regime. It allows
banks to take the lead in designing internal compliance policies and
procedures to meet general regulatory objectives that are aimed at the
drivers of misconduct risk. It thus gives institutional stakeholders the
opportunity to advise regulators about what types of compliance systems
work best—and then to prove their success—before top-down regulation is
imposed, if at all.227 It thus reflects, at base, a complementarity or
management-based regulation approach in which regulators deploy their
relative expertise at goal or agenda setting on an industry-wide basis, and
the private market deploys its relative advantage in knowing the nuances of
the industry and intimate understanding of what motivates its employees’
behavior and why. Although regulators should be mindful not to let
flexible standards become “sticky,” ideally, they should encourage the
kinds of experiments that address the drivers of misconduct and its
contagion.228 Below are a few examples of what regulators might look for
in evaluating a bank’s performance during a compliance stress test.

224. See Gary Klein, Performing a Project Premortem, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept. 2007, at
18.
225. See id. at 18.
226. Admittedly this information may be somewhat redundant with information already
provided to regulators (local or federal) in conjunction with existing supervisory schemes but
should nonetheless be incorporated into the Fed’s determination as to whether the bank
passes the compliance stress test. Over time, regulatory redundancies or overlap could be
eliminated.
227. See generally Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Experimentalist Governance, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE 169–83 (David Levi-Faur ed., 2012).
228. See supra Part II.
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a. Imputed Responsibility to Managing Directors
Clarifying the consequences of misconduct at the managing director level
can help reduce the extent to which complexity is used as an “accountability
firewall.”229 Specifically, making responsibilities broader and clearer can
strip away the ability to hide behind complexity. The United Kingdom
provides an interesting model. Regulators there recently designed a “Senior
Managers and Certification Regime,” in force as of March 7, 2016.230
Pursuant to this new regime, covered financial firms are required to submit
to regulators a “Statement of Responsibilities” and a “Management
Responsibilities Map” setting out the areas in which managers are
responsible.231 For a time, the U.K. certification regime also included a
“presumption of responsibility” against which managers would be held for
any issues of misconduct unless they could show that they took steps to
prevent it, but recent legislation replaces that reverse burden with a
The theory behind the U.K.
statutory duty of responsibility.232
accountability regime seems promising:
by ramping hierarchical
accountability, managers are better incentivized to understand and closely
monitor even the most complex transactions. Following this U.K.
experiment, supervisors in the United States and elsewhere might use
compliance stress testing to encourage banks to experiment with a similar
responsibility regime, which the banks themselves could establish and
govern internally.
Regulators might also use compliance stress testing to encourage banks
to experiment with more creative ways to link professional misconduct to
bankers’ reputation. An apocryphal story has it that the CEO of a large
private investment company once told his employees that if they ever
engaged in a whiff of misconduct, he would use all of the resources at his
disposal to ensure that the person never worked in finance again. The
lesson to take away from that anecdote is that bank managers could exploit
the value of their bankers’ and traders’ social capital and treat it like a form
of reputational compensation paid and earned in a prestige-driven industry.
229. PARLIAMENTARY COMM’N ON BANKING STANDARDS, CHANGING BANKING FOR GOOD:
REPORT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION ON BANKING STANDARDS (VOLUME I), 2013–
14, HL 27-II, at 16 (UK), http://www.parliament.uk/documents/banking-commission/
Banking-final-report-volume-i.pdf [perma.cc/DV74-ZJKT].
230. See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., CP15/22, STRENGTHENING ACCOUNTABILITY IN BANKING
5–6
(2015),
https://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/consultation-papers/cp15-22.pdf
[perma.cc/2EL5-PDNA]; SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES ARISING
FROM THE REVISED UK SENIOR MANAGER AND CERTIFICATION REGIME 2 (2015),
http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/2015/11/Implementatio
n-Issues-Arising-from-the-Revised-UK-Senior-Manager-and-Certification-Regime-FIA100215.pdf [perma.cc/X5VF-XFU2].
231. See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 230, at 112.
232. MAYER BROWN LLP, THE UK’S NEW REGULATORY REGIME FOR INDIVIDUALS PART 3:
THE BANK OF ENGLAND AND FINANCIAL SERVICES BILL 2015, at 1 (2015),
https://www.mayerbrown.com/files/Publication/cc394777-75ce-44db-87de-e2c866716baa/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/99ccc8ff-0b2c-4ad1-b067-ecbddacca029/UK-newregulatory-regime-for-individuals-Part-3_oct1615.pdf [perma.cc/CH9V-GLE7]; SHEARMAN
& STERLING LLP, supra note 230, at 2–3.

2016]

MISCONDUCT RISK

1603

Stated differently, if bank managers exact a reputational price for
misconduct, which costs bankers and traders their professional mobility,
such consequences may not only disincentivize misconduct, but also inhibit
the spread of unethical norms throughout the industry.
b. Per Se Clawbacks
Much ink has been spilled on the topic of executive compensation and
how best to structure compensation to avoid serious agency and moral
hazard problems.233 Financial reform legislation in the United States has
commonly required that companies instate clawback policies as a way to
incentivize proper conduct. However, the most prominent of these
clawback provisions—found both in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and
the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010—have been rather narrow in scope, limited to
accounting misstatements by senior executives.234 Europe, in contrast, has
recently expanded its clawback regime to include misconduct more broadly.
Capital Requirements Directive IV requires banks to make up to 100
percent of discretionary pay subject to malus or clawbacks “in situations
where the employee contributed to conduct which resulted in significant
losses to the institution or failed to meet appropriate fit and proper
standards.”235 In the United Kingdom, under new rules in effect on January
1, 2015, all firms regulated by the Prudential Regulatory Authority must
clawback compensation “in instances of misconduct” for up to seven years
Following those examples,
after the compensation is awarded.236
institutionally arranged clawback policies may be another feature that
regulators could “test” during a compliance stress test. In particular,
regulators might view favorably simulation responses that demonstrated
clear policies for clawing back compensation from both the junior bankers
directly involved in misconduct as well as from the managing directors
overseeing the teams.
Increasing accountability through clawback policies, at the middle
manager level especially, could be a fruitful experiment in enhancing
accountability. Clawing back managing directors’ compensation could
have a far-reaching incentive effect in a bank. For managing directors, the
233. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 33; Roberta Romano & Sanjai Bhagat,
Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and Committing to the Long-Term, 26 YALE
J. REG. 359 (2009).
234. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2012); Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376,
§ 954 (2010); see Press Release, SEC, SEC Proposes Rules Requiring Companies to Adopt
Clawback Policies on Executive Compensation (July 1, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/
news/pressrelease/2015-136.html [perma.cc/CNK8-XTE7].
235. Will Pearce & Michael Sholem, Remuneration in the Financial Services Industry
2015, HARV. CORP. L. & GOVERNANCE BLOG (Sept. 18, 2015), http://corpgov.law.harvard.
edu/2015/09/18/remuneration-in-the-financial-services-industry-2015
[perma.cc/XGF7692L]; see Directive 2013/36/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June
2013 on Access to the Activity of Credit Institutions and the Prudential Supervision of Credit
Institutions and Investment Firms and Amending Directive 2002/87/EC and Repealing
Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, art. 94(n), 2013 O.J. (L 176) 338, 389.
236. Pearce & Sholem, supra note 235.
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prospect of several years of lost compensation would likely motivate—
strongly—these senior bankers to monitor more closely the transactions
within their zones of responsibility. The increased oversight could in turn
change the status quo in which junior bankers have come to expect that
profits from misconduct can inflate their compensation well before
misconduct is discovered or linked to that individual’s actions.
Consequently, if managing directors are more aggressively incentivized to
oversee their subordinates—and be ethical mentors more broadly—then
junior bankers’ risk-reward calculus changes significantly, and misconduct
seems like a much less rational choice.237
Though less studied, linking compensation to value-based goals may also
have potential. This linkage has some precedent outside the financial
services industry. Wal-Mart, for example, has used executive compensation
to further diversity goals.238 In 2004, a class action was filed against WalMart for discrimination.239 Before the class was certified, Wal-Mart
announced that, as a compliance initiative, it would tie compensation to
diversity goals regarding women and other minorities.240 Something
similar might work in banks, where executive or managerial compensation
is tied to conduct-related goals. Measuring improvement would, of course,
be a real challenge in the short term; but the experiment itself may prompt
more work to be done on finding good metrics to assess changes in conduct.
c. Mapping Networks
Lastly, because a major pipeline for interbank misconduct is social, it is
important for the CCO to understand and be able to map the social and
professional networks of the bank’s employees. This requires a shift in the
current hierarchical and inward focus of compliance departments.
Becoming familiar with bankers’ and traders’ employment and educational
backgrounds would be a good first start in understanding whom they may
be speaking to and how they might be influenced.
C. International Regulatory Coordination
As earlier noted, Part III’s principal goal is to urge national bank
regulators—like central banks—to strengthen Basel III’s existing Pillar 2 in
order to better address misconduct risk in the global banking sector. Part III
also offered one preliminary suggestion for how this might be done through
qualitative stress testing. Going forward, the remainder of Part III is largely
architectural:
it provides a second policy proposal for achieving
international cooperation around a new Pillar 2 supervisory rule. To that
237. See Sepe & Whitehead, supra note 121.
238. See Constance L. Hays, Wal-Mart Plans Changes to Some Labor Practices, N.Y.
TIMES, June 5, 2004, at C2.
239. See Steven Greenhouse & Constance L. Hays, Wal-Mart Sex-Bias Suit Given ClassAction Status, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2004, at A1.
240. Michael Barbaro, Wal-Mart Promises to Do Better, WASH. POST, June 5, 2004, at
E01.
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end, Part III.C first presents a proposal for using the Basel regime as a
vehicle for brokering international regulatory coordination around enhanced
supervision of misconduct risk. Part III.C concludes with a suggestion,
albeit speculative, that the trade-off proposed would enhance stability and
efficiency in the global banking sector.
The basic proposal builds on an argument made by Professor Roberta
Romano for a “diversity mechanism” in Basel: that Basel requirements
“operate as ‘off the rack’ defaults” that could be altered in any direction,
subject to a peer review and ongoing monitoring.241 The proposal here is to
modify Basel III to give states discretion to depart from the current capital
regime (say, from the Tier 1 or the buffer requirement) in exchange for
implementing supervisory exercises that monitor for misconduct risk—such
as compliance stress testing or another agreed upon supervisory program
that accomplished the same goals.242 In this way, Pillar 1 would be used to
set a baseline as it currently does, from which national regulators could
depart downward by some preapproved amount, upon undertaking
additional supervision.
Why would states agree to do this? For one, as Romano has pointed out,
national regulators, it appears, want to cooperate with Basel.243 For the
most part, major financial jurisdictions have not (visibly) cheated with
respect to the Basel III regime in this post-Crisis order, despite the
competitive gains that cheating in this system could yield for any one
country’s national banks.244 Quite likely, regulators perceive Basel as
necessary to their collective economic stability. At the same time, states are
also surely aware of the economic advantages of lower capital ratios for
their banks. Taken together, lower capital ratios should be attractive to
national regulators, but only if such abatement neither sacrifices stability of
the global economic environment in which their banks do business nor risks
the ire of their economic partners. A capital-for-supervision regulatory
tradeoff could serve those dual objectives.
Having sketched out the basic idea of a capital-supervision tradeoff, the
remainder of Part III.C briefly explains why using Pillar 1 to incentivize
national regulatory action under Pillar 2—i.e., creating a capital-forsupervision tradeoff—is desirable for stability and efficiency reasons.245
241. Romano, supra note 15, at 6–7 (urging greater experimentation in the Basel regime,
whereby states “present [a] contemplated departure” to Basel for the Committee’s approval,
which, if accepted, would be subject to “ongoing monitoring and periodic reassessment”).
242. For an explanation of how Basel arrived at the Basel III capital ratios for Tier 1
common equity and the buffer, see Beverly Hirtle, How Were the Basel 3 Minimum Capital
Requirements
Calibrated?,
FED.
RES.
BANK
N.Y.
(Mar.
28,
2011),
http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2011/03/calibrating-regulatory-minimumcapital-requirements.html#.VV_ARU_BzRY [perma.cc/7PQQ-PMVS].
243. Romano, supra note 15, at 10–11.
244. Cf. Anu Bradford, International Antitrust Negotiations and the False Hope of the
WTO, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 383 (2007) (applying a game theoretic lens to analyze ongoing
negotiations between the United States and European Union regarding whether the World
Trade Organization should be expanded to include antitrust issues).
245. See Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 208 (noting that these goals should animate and
constrain systemic risk regulation).
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1. Stability
There are several reasons why supervising misconduct risk should be an
internationally coordinated effort. For one, the institutions that perpetuate
misconduct risk are global. While most of these banks have operations in
the United States, and are thus subject to Fed supervision as “foreign bank
operations” (FBOs), the FBOs’ primary regulators are of course foreign; the
mothership operations are outside the Fed’s supervisory purview.
Coordination between host and home regulators is therefore of practical
necessity to ensure that any one global bank is, as a whole, resilient against
misconduct risk. Related is the problem of regulatory arbitrage, whereby,
in the absence of international coordination, a global bank can evade new
supervisory standards for conduct simply by shifting its activities to an un(or less-) regulated jurisdiction.246
Yet absent compelling incentives, international coordination around
enhanced supervisory standards may be difficult to negotiate. From the
perspective of European regulators and their legislatures, at least, creating
more regulation in the current political environment may be too
unpalatable.247 Public authorities may fear that more regulation, now, will
weaken the competitiveness of the national financial industry or that
reluctant states will defect and refuse to go along when push comes to
shove.248 Moreover, one might expect the financial industry itself to lobby
against added measures out of concern for growing compliance costs and
the perceived inefficiencies of additional government involvement. Such
private sector resistance would further impede regulators’ (or politicians’)
willpower to implement additional misconduct-related measures.
With respect to qualitative stress testing specifically, consider the
difference in stress testing that already exists between the United States and
Europe—two of the most significant financial services jurisdictions. The

246. See Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street As Community of Fate: Toward Financial
Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 416 (2011) (referring to regulatory
arbitrage as the phenomenon “whereby financial institutions find new ways to get around
government rules, thus creating a never-ending spiral of rulemaking and rule evading”).
247. Both France and Germany appear to have resisted increased capital requirements in
the Basel III accord. See Alex Barker & Brooke Masters, EU Ministers Set for Clash Over
Banking Rules, FIN. TIMES, May 2, 2012, at 2; Donna Borak, Bair Details Inside Story of
Regulatory Clash Over Basel III, AM. BANKER (Sept. 25, 2012), http://
www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_186/bair-details-inside-story-of-regulatory-clashover-basel-1053019-1.html [perma.cc/9C2R-KLJG].
248. As the Deutsche Bundesbank has said,
The supervisory review process represents a great challenge for banking
supervisors in Germany. In the international context it is crucial to achieve greater
harmonisation not only of major rules, such as the capital requirements imposed on
banks, but also of prudential practices to ensure a level playing field for banks in
different countries.
Pillar 2: The Supervisory Review Process (SRP), DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, http://www.
bundesbank.de/Navigation/EN/Tasks/Banking_supervision/Basel2/Supervisory_review_proc
ess/supervisory_review_process.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) [perma.cc/9C2R-KLJG];
see Pierre-Hughes Verdier, Mutual Recognition in International Finance, 52 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 55, 67 (2011) (discussing financial regulation as a prisoner’s dilemma).
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EBA has not yet adopted a qualitative component of stress testing.249 And,
regardless, its standards in general have seemed lax since stress testing
began in Europe in 2010. European officials admitted that the 2014
exercise was too soft, as was made all too clear after Ireland’s two largest
banks were bailed out by the government only two weeks after passing the
test.250 (Other banks have also failed after passing the EBA’s test.251) But
Europe may nonetheless resist an expansion of its stress testing regime.
European officials have registered their disagreement with the way in which
the Fed stress tests European FBOs and criticized the qualitative component
of CCAR as subjective.252 This suggests that using capital ratios as carrots
may be the most effective way to motivate nations to agree to collectively
undertake a supervisory exercise like compliance stress testing.
2. Efficiency
Efficiency provides a second reason for offering Pillar 1 capital
reductions where a new Pillar 2 supervisory rule is adopted. To begin, a
capital-for-supervision tradeoff makes intuitive economic sense. Removing
risk from the system by reducing misconduct should enable a reduction in
firms’ capital requirements—which are, after all, designed to protect banks
from hypothetical stress, including that which might be caused by
systemically significant misconduct. Therefore, if a jurisdiction reduces
misconduct risk from its financial environment, its national banks will on
average withstand less stress and should, therefore, require a lower capital
reserve as a buffer.253
Moreover, regulators may soon be looking for safe ways to lower Pillar
1’s capital requirements in the coming years. The Basel regime (along with

249. See EUR. BANKING AUTH., MAIN FEATURES OF THE 2014 EU-WIDE STRESS TEST
(2014),
https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/563711/Communication+on+the+
2014+EU-wide+stress+test.pdf [perma.cc/C4VD-FE28]; EUR. BANKING AUTH., RESULTS OF
THE 2014 EU-WIDE STRESS TESTS (2014), http://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/
669262/2014+EU-wide+ST-aggregate+results.pdf [perma.cc/6BVR-XTR4]. It is important
to note, however, that in the 2016 stress test, the European Banking Authority is planning to
include a conduct risk component in the exercise, which will require “[b]anks [to] project the
P&L impact of losses arising from conduct risk and other operational risks, using, when
relevant, their internal models and, in the case of conduct risk, available qualitative
information.” EUR. BANKING AUTH., EU-WIDE STRESS TEST 2016: DRAFT METHODOLOGICAL
NOTE 76 (2015), http://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1259315/DRAFT+2016+EUwide+ST+methodological+note.pdf [perma.cc/7C6Z-EB8C].
250. See Viktoria Dendrinou & Stephen Fidler, EU Regulator Wary of Fed Capital Rules,
WALL STREET J. (Feb. 24, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/european-banks-neednt-alsogo-through-feds-stress-test-eu-official-says-1424800563 (reporting that earlier stress tests
“didn’t address issues addressed by the Fed’s [stress] test, including how the banks are
governed, risk management and other more qualitative factors”) [perma.cc/GK69-EJ99].
251. P.W., Setting the Exam, ECONOMIST (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.economist.com/
blogs/freeexchange/2014/01/european-banking-stress-tests [perma.cc/4D82-CDLY].
252. Dendrinou & Fidler, supra note 250.
253. Note that because capital ratios are principally concerned with bank failure, the
political and economic rationale for trading capital requirements off for compliance stress
testing lies in the possibility that misconduct risk contributes to systemic banking crises, as
was seen in the Crisis.
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the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States) appears to have had some
unintended consequences.254 A recent report by the Office of Financial
Research, an independent arm of the Treasury, indicated that inventories of
fixed-income assets are down in the broker-dealers.255 Shrinking
inventories implies that financial institutions will be less able to keep
liquidity flowing in the event of a stressful shock.256
There is also some reason to think that the costs of complying with the
Basel regime may be weakening banks’ defenses against other threats to
their stability. A study conducted by the market research group Federal
Financial Analytics found that U.S. banks alone absorb $70.2 billion a year
in post-Crisis regulatory costs.257 These costs detract from the resources
that banks have to deal with other operational risks, like cyber-attacks and
information failure.258 In fact, regulators now fear that “banks simply lack
the resources with which to meet new rules, support credit demand, and
simultaneously increase their resilience to cyber-attack and undertake other
costly information-technology improvements.”259 And this strain on the
global banking sector has implications for financial stability more broadly:
254. See FED. FINANCIAL ANALYTICS, INC., WHAT HATH ALL THE RULES WROUGHT?
ASSESSING THE SUCCESS OF THE POST-CRISIS FRAMEWORK (2015), http://www.fedfin.com/
images/stories/client_reports/Assessing%20the%20Success%20of%20the%20PostCrisis%20Framework.pdf [perma.cc/JMP6-XF4M]; Rob Blackwell, The Seven Risks That
Could Aggravate the Next Crisis, AM. BANKER (Apr. 29, 2015, 12:44 PM),
http://www.americanbanker.com/news/law-regulation/the-seven-risks-that-could-aggravatethe-next-crisis-1074063-1.html [perma.cc/3J3Y-2SAC]; John Heltman, Regulators Worry
New Rules May Freeze Markets, AM. BANKER (June 12, 2015), http://www.americanbanker.
com/news/law-regulation/regulators-worry-new-rules-may-freeze-markets-1074851-1.html
(noting concern that Basel III rules have tightened market liquidity) [perma.cc/F279-M5PG];
Stephen A. Schwarzman, How the Next Financial Crisis Will Happen, WALL STREET J., June
10, 2015, at A15 (arguing that this “expansive and untested regulatory framework . . . may
well fuel the next financial crisis as well as slow U.S. economic growth”).
255. OFFICE OF FIN. RESEARCH, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 31–32 (2015), https://financial
research.gov/annual-reports/files/office-of-financial-research-annual-report-2014.pdf (citing,
among various reasons for declining liquidity, that “[r]egulations requiring banks to hold
more capital and more restrictive constrains on leverage have increased the cost of securities
financing activities and reduced incentives to maintain them”) [perma.cc/KGM5-98ND].
256. John Heltman, Data Agency Sees Hazards in Liquidity, Treasury Market, AM.
BANKER (June 26, 2015), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/law-regulation/dataagency-sees-hazards-in-liquidity-treasury-market-1075109-1.html
[perma.cc/UW3WUZAK]. As Heltman writes, “Those observations echo many made by industry and
government officials, who have grown increasingly concerned that liquidity in the fixedincome markets is drying up and that the Dodd-Frank regulatory apparatus is largely to
blame.” Id. But see John Heltman, Is Regulation the Reason Liquidity Is So Unstable?, AM.
BANKER (Aug. 24, 2015), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/law-regulation/isregulation-the-reason-liquidity-is-so-unstable-1076270-1.html (noting that whether recent
regulation is causing the lack of liquidity in bond markets is a contested matter)
[perma.cc/3X5L-DXK8].
257. FED. FINANCIAL ANALYTICS, INC., supra note 254, at 9; see Martin Arnold, Tougher
Regulation Is a Foot on the Jugular for Investing Powerhouses, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2015,
at 14 (noting that “[t]here are many reasons why these powerhouses [Citigroup, Bank of
America, Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse, Barclays, and Morgan Stanley], which regularly
generated pre-crisis returns above 20 per cent, now struggle to earn more than their cost of
capital. But the biggest one is clear: tougher regulation”).
258. FED. FINANCIAL ANALYTICS, INC., supra note 254, at 9.
259. Id. at 8.
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“To the extent operational resilience is weakened at banking organizations,
financial-market operational resilience will be similarly strained, especially
in complex, cross-border, and/or capital markets operations.”260
Lastly, the growth of the “shadow banking” sector may be another side
effect of heightened capital requirements. The shadow banking system
consists of an unregulated (or laxly regulated) system of financial
intermediation, much of which involves securitization and wholesale
funding.261 Some have argued that financial activity is migrating to the
shadow banking sector in response to (i.e., to avoid) the cost of new
regulation imposed on traditional banks.262 The expanse of shadow
banking has regulators worried—and possibly, with good reason. It makes
the economy vulnerable to destabilizing events like asset bubbles; shadow
banking also increases “liquidity discontinuity” (because it, like the
traditional banking sector, “provides short-term funding for long-term
capital needs”), which can lead to events that mimic a classic bank run.263
And the growth of this system may also increase misconduct risk insofar as
these institutions’ opacity (and diffusion) make monitoring for misconduct
difficult.264 For all of these reasons and others, Mark Carney named
shadow banking as “the greatest danger to the world economy,” and the
Economist described it as a “huge, fast-growing,” “little understood,” and
“potentially explosive” area.265
Ultimately, it is somewhat speculative to say that reducing capital ratios
will reduce or slow the growth of the shadow banking system or will restore
liquidity. But the proposal for a capital-for-supervision trade-off should, at
a minimum, prompt regulatory thought about the optimal balance between
260. Id.
261. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L.
619, 621 (2012). Former Federal Reserve Board Chairmen Ben Bernanke defined shadow
banking as “compris[ing] a diverse set of institutions and markets that, collectively, carry out
traditional banking functions—but do so outside, or in ways only loosely linked to, the
traditional system of regulated depository institutions.” Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, U.S.
Fed. Reserve, Some Reflections on the Crisis and the Policy Response (Apr. 13, 2012),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20120413a.htm [perma.cc/LX2B
-3WBU].
262. See, e.g., Gary Gorton & Andre Metrick, The Federal Reserve and Panic
Prevention: The Roles of Financial Regulation and Lender of Last Resort, 27 J. ECON.
PERSP. 45, 58 (2013) (noting the growth of the shadow banking sector); Schwarcz, supra
note 261, at 624; Howard Mustoe, Casting Light on Shadow Banking, BBC (June 17, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-27868278 [perma.cc/E5A5-99N5]; The Lure of Shadow
Banking, ECONOMIST, May 10, 2014, at 11 (explaining that shadow banking has proliferated
because traditional banks are “on the back foot, battered by losses incurred during the
financial crisis and beset by heavier regulation, higher capital requirements, endless legal
troubles and swingeing fines”).
263. Schwarcz, supra note 261, at 625; see ZOLTAN POSZAR ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK
OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 458: SHADOW BANKING 1 (2010; revised 2012).
264. Awrey, supra note 103, at 275 (arguing that complexity and innovation create a
relatively more hospitable environment for “fraud, misconduct, and other opportunistic
behavior on the party of financial intermediaries”); see Judge, supra note 19; see also
POSZAR ET AL., supra note 263, at 10–12 (explaining the various steps involved in structured
intermediation).
265. The Lure of Shadow Banking, supra note 262.
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capital and supervision—and challenge the assumption that Basel II has
struck it.
CONCLUSION
This Article has offered a framework for understanding misconduct as a
distinct category of risk to the global markets—misconduct risk. It has
argued that misconduct risk is underaddressed in the current architecture of
global banking regulation, embodied in the Basel regime. In particular, this
Article critiqued the imbalance in this international framework: that it
focuses on the quantitative sources of risk in banks but neglects the
systemic significance of misconduct risk. Given the costs that misconduct
risk imposes, striking a better balance should be a high priority for banking
regulation today.
Yet in order for regulators to most effectively deploy their finite
resources to reduce misconduct risk, they must first understand the drivers
of that risk. This Article explored three structural features of the banking
sector that, together, give rise to misconduct risk in the global banking
sector. It then offered a policy proposal to address it: to modify Pillar 2 of
the Basel III regime to include standards for “compliance stress testing,”
which would leverage the private sector’s efforts to reduce misconduct risk
by inhibiting its industry-wide growth and transmission. Ultimately, it
suggested how that revision might be coordinated among Basel’s members.

